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Religion, Russo-British Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy in Anna Ivanovna’s Russia
(1730-1740)
Chairperson: Robert Greene

The reign of Russian empress Anna Ivanovna (1730-1740) has been known
primarily for disproportionate “German” influence, Anna’s refusing the “conditions”
imposed by the supposedly backward-looking noble faction that engineered her
succession, and unflattering court spectacle. Religion and foreign policy have received
relatively little attention. Meanwhile, the formalization of Anglo-Russian diplomatic and
trade relations during Anna’s reign has been seen as the triumph of “modern” nobility
who rose as a result of the Petrine reforms. Examination of the concomitant diplomatic
relations has focused on the strategies and personalities of Anna’s “German” advisors and
portrays Russia as dependent. Finally, the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, if mentioned
at all, is generally seen as a humiliating defeat.
This study reveals the “Lutheran Yoke” as an aspect of the infamous “German
Yoke,” in the context of ongoing integration of Lutheran Baltic German elites whose
territories were annexed during Peter I’s reign. Religion had been a divisive issue within
and without Russia when Peter’s church reforms were criticized as “Lutheran” by clergy
with roots in Kiev and sympathetic to Catholic doctrine. 1730s Russia remained a locus
of interdenominational cross-fertilization and conflict, integrated into confessional
struggles across Europe.
Russia did not overcome backwardness to enter into the Anglo-Russian
Commercial Treaty of 1734. Nor did the British carry off a diplomatic coup by forcing
Russia to move forward without a reciprocal defensive alliance. Rather, after the
resolution of decades of Jacobite/Hanoverian and strategic struggle that strained relations,
Russia used the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 as leverage to secure the
British/Dutch mediation that allowed it to remove troops from Poland during the War of
the Polish Succession.
Though some attribute religious motivations to the Russo-Turkish war of 173639, nearly all historians consider control of the Crimea and Black Sea the objective.
British correspondence reveals Russia’s additional motivation to maintain the Caucasian
isthmus as a buffer and trade zone. The Treaty of Belgrade (1739), disallowing Russia
from fortifying Azov or sailing its own ships on the Black Sea, appears less humiliating
when we recognize that Russia continued to benefit from Persian trade without the
expense of occupation.
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Introduction	
  
Anna Ivanovna’s reign (1730 – 1740), a decade receiving relatively little attention
in English-language Russian historiography, deserves fresh examination. The last
English book-length exploration of Empress Anna’s rule was a biography published in
1974.1 When Anna ascended in 1730, she became the third sovereign to reign since Peter
I's death in 1725 and in so doing thwarted the plans of a section of the nobility who
attempted to place restraints on her monarchical power through the famous “conditions”
she initially accepted. Her reign has been known primarily for the events surrounding her
succession; disproportionate “German” influence; and unflattering, cruel court spectacle.2
Other aspects of her rule have been highlighted, however. The court returned to
St. Petersburg in 1732 after having returned to Moscow during the reign of Peter II,
resulting in a reinvigoration of the city and a rehabilitation of the navy. Anna’s court was
known for its incredible splendor, rivaling those of Western Europe, as well as for the
development of the ballet, and the Italianizing of court music.3 The Land Forces Cadet
College, opened in Moscow in 1731, was the first indigenous institution to offer
performing arts training, providing young men instruction in music and dance. In 1738 a
ballet school, which would eventually become the St. Petersburg School of Ballet,

1

Mina Curtiss, A Forgotten Empress – Anna Ivanovna and Her Era: 1730 – 1740 (New York: Frederick
Ungar Publishing Co., 1974).
2
Alexander Lipski, in "A Re-Examination of the 'Dark Era' of Anna Ionnovna," American Slavonic and
East European Review 15 no. 4 (1956), rehabilitated Anna’s reign by countering vitriolic, anti-“German”
nineteenth-century historiography with an emphasis on the westernizing achievements of prominent
Germanophone servitors. Curtiss emphasized cultural developments but also positioned Anna’s reign as a
dark harbinger of the most oppressive aspects of Soviet rule.
3
Marina Ritzarev, Eighteenth-century Russian Music (Aldershoot: Ashgate, 2006), 39.
1

opened to males and females.4 In 1734, Russia decided officially to make the Orenburg
fort complex across the Qupchaq steppe its “Window to the East,” initiating a more
concerted effort to govern the nomadic peoples of the steppe, extend its frontiers into
Central Asia, and build wealth through Central Asian trade.5
In the legal sphere, Anna reversed Peter the Great’s Law of Single Inheritance in
1731, apparently securing noble women’s rights and over time, leading to an expansion
of the rights of other women.6 In 1736, Anna “reduced the [noble] service requirement to
25 years and allowed one son to stay home and look after the estate.”7 Laws promulgated
under Anna forbid peasants from buying “real estate or mills, establish factories, or
become parties to government leases or contracts.” After 1731, “landlords acquired
increasing financial control over their serfs, for whose taxes they were held responsible.”
Subsequent to 1736, they had to obtain landlord permission before departing for
temporary employment.8
This work turns toward less explored and misinterpreted areas of Anna’s reign.
Religion and foreign policy have received little attention relative to the above-mentioned
developments. Additionally, the formalization of Anglo-Russian diplomatic and trade
relations during Anna’s reign has been erroneously interpreted as the triumph of
“modern” nobility who rose as a result of the Petrine reforms. Examination of the
diplomatic relations surrounding the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 has
4

Lurana Donnels O’Malley, “Signs from Empresses and Actresses: Women and Theatre in the Eighteenth
Century,” in Women in Russian Culture and Society, 1700-1825 (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),
12.
5
Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 156.
6
Barbara Alpern Engel, Women in Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) xv.
7
Lindsey Hughes, The Romanovs: Ruling Russia 1613-1917 (New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2008),
97.
8
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia Fifth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993),
250.
2

focused on the strategies and personalities of Anna’s “German” advisors and portrays
Russia as dependent on the British. Finally, the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, if
mentioned at all, is generally seen as a humiliating defeat. Examination of these three
areas allows us to begin to deepen our understanding of post-Petrine religious,
diplomatic, and foreign policy developments.
Chapter 1 reveals that under Peter I and Anna Ivanovna, Russia underwent what
we will call confessionalized westernization. The “Lutheran Yoke” emerges as an aspect
of the infamous “German Yoke,” in the context of Russia’s ongoing integration of
Lutheran Baltic German elites whose territories were annexed during Peter I’s reign
(1682-1725). Russia had been undergoing “westernization” through Polish-Lithuanian
and Ukrainian influences in the latter half of the seventeenth century, especially after the
annexation of Kiev. In the early eighteenth century, religion became a divisive issue
within and without Russia when Peter’s church reforms were criticized as “Lutheran” by
clergy with roots in Kiev and sympathetic to Catholic doctrine. Additionally, during
Peter I’s reign, a mixture of esoteric, Pietist, and additional influences from Jacobite
notables impacted court culture. As we shall see, 1730s Russia remained a locus of
interdenominational cross-fertilization and conflict, integrated into confessional struggles
across Europe.
Chapter 2 focuses on the factors that enabled Russia and Britain to commence
formal diplomatic and trade relations in 1734. Historians who have examined diplomatic
maneuvers surrounding the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 have focused on
the treaty itself, concluding that Russia had to capitulate without securing a much soughtafter reciprocal defensive alliance. Moreover, Russia supposedly had to overcome

3

“backward” nobility without any interest in Western trade to want to secure the formal
alliance. In actuality, after the resolution of decades of Jacobite/Hanoverian and strategic
struggle that strained relations, Russia used the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of
1734 as leverage to secure the British/Dutch mediation that allowed it to remove troops
from Poland during the War of the Polish Succession. This reveals not only that Russia
actually did secure the outcome it desired from the negotiations but also that it is
important to look beyond official treaties to understand the outcomes of states’
negotiations.
There may not be a more important question than why wars are fought. Though
some attribute religious motivations to the Russo-Turkish war of 1736-39, nearly all
historians consider control of the Crimea and Black Sea the objective. As we see in
Chapter 3, however, British correspondence reveals Russia’s additional motivation to
maintain the Caucasian isthmus as a buffer and trade zone. The Treaty of Belgrade that
ended the war in 1739, disallowing Russia from fortifying Azov or sailing its own ships
on the Black Sea, appears less humiliating when we recognize that Russia continued to
benefit from Persian trade without the expense of continuing to occupy the territories it
ceded just before hostilities broke out.
This study relies almost entirely on British diplomatic correspondence, which is,
of course, inherently problematic. The British accounts are written primarily from the
point of view of diplomat Claudius Rondeau and rely on court discussions and gossip, as
well as conversations with Russian cabinet members or favorites.9 Upon his

9

Rondeau was born to French Protestant immigrants to Britain and beginning in 1728 served as a secretary
to his predecessor at the Russian court, Thomas Ward. See Katherine Turner, ‘Vigor , Jane (1699–
1783)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008.
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predecessor’s untimely death, Rondeau promptly married his widow and then faithfully
served King George II until he perished from what seems to have been a cold in 1739.
Rondeau’s assessments of affairs are not always accurate. This information may seem
less reliable than the official communications or publications of statespersons, however,
in many respects communications at court could have been just as dissimulative or
revealing as official communications. Additionally, the correspondence includes the
points of view of the king, the Secretary of the Northern Department in Britain, and
reports from British residents across Europe. These dispatches, providing multiple points
of view and valuable insights, have been underutilized.
The chief sources are three volumes of the Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago
obshchestva, or documents published by the Russian Historical Society. These books,
printed in the late eighteenth century, contain transcriptions of British correspondence.
This work is based on the years 1729 – 1739, representing around 1700 pages of
dispatches. Additionally, the Hanbury Williams Papers from the Lewis Walpole Library
in Farmington, CT have been utilized. Correspondence between Lord Harrington,
Secretary of Britain’s Northern Department, and George Woodward, envoy to
Saxony/Poland in Warsaw, provide insight into the religious strife occurring in Poland
during the War of the Polish Succession.

5

Chapter	
  I	
  -‐	
  
Interdenominational	
  Russia:	
  Lutheranism	
  and	
  Elite	
  
Integration	
  in	
  the	
  Post-‐Petrine	
  Age	
  
Anna Ivanovna’s reign (1730-1740) quickly became notorious for the
disproportionate number of “Germans” who wielded influence at her court. While the
historiography on her rule has shifted between emphases on “weak” and “strong” German
influence, examined the conflicting motivations of statespersons, or celebrated the
modernizing innovations of particular “German” notables, it has not considered
“German” prominence as an aspect of ongoing elite integration.10 Though many of the
Germanophone advisors at court hailed from areas outside of the empire, including
Westphalia and Courland, others came from Baltic German territories that had been
annexed by Russia during the Great Northern War (1700-21). These primarily Lutheran
elites received a disproportionate number of official appointments and would continue to
wield strong influence over governmental affairs through the nineteenth century.
Just as elite integration has received little attention, the religious aspect of conflict
among the new elites has not been considered as an aspect of the “German Yoke.” This
chapter examines two confessionally related incidents recorded in British diplomatic
correspondence during Anna Ivanovna’s reign that have not been explored in Englishlanguage literature.11 First, in 1732 the Duke of Illyria, the previous Spanish envoy to the
Russian court, published an inflammatory text with the help of Russian Orthodox clergy,
10

John T. Alexander minimizes the role of Germans in, "The Petrine Era and After: 1689 – 1740," in
Russia: A History, Third Edition, ed. by Gregory Freeze (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 128.
11
Mina Curtiss devotes a chapter to “Church and Court” but focuses primarily on ceremony and the trials
of church reformer Feofan Prokopovich during Peter II’s reign. He had been instrumental in Peter the
Great’s church reforms and also justified the execution of Peter II’s father, Alexis. Curtiss mentions the
troop deployment issue in the context of a discussion about Biron’s character. See Mina Curtiss, A
Forgotten Empress - Anna Ivanovna and her Era (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co, 1974), 130142 and 82-83.
6

denouncing Anna’s Lutheran-dominated regime and castigating Lutherans and Calvinists.
Second, in 1734 the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI (r. 1711-1740) refused to allow
Ernst Johann Biron (1690 – 1772), Anna’s Great Chamberlain and quasi-husband, to
build a Lutheran church on land the emperor had given him in the Silesian county of
Wartenburg within the Holy Roman Empire (HRE). In response, the Russian court
withheld the troops Charles desperately needed during the War of the Polish Succession
(1733-1735). Placing these events in the context of early-eighteenth-century European
confessional strife reveals that religion remained a powerfully divisive political and
rhetorical force across Europe into the 1730s. Though issues related to religion alone did
not cause The War of the Polish Succession, the events surrounding the war, and ongoing
religious strife in Central and Eastern Europe, evoked primarily Lutheran-Catholic
struggles that occurred throughout the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Events in
Russia also evoked religious conflict from that time, when the promotion of St.
Petersburg as a “new Jerusalem” and debates about Peter I’s church reforms circulated
throughout Europe. That Anna Ivanovna’s decade, often associated with the “German
yoke” of Baltic and Westphalian advisors, was also to some degree portrayed as a
“Lutheran” yoke reveals continuity with Russian and Ukrainian criticisms of Peter the
Great’s church reforms from earlier in the century. Further, the Lutheran Pietism and
esotericism generally associated with Catherine II’s reign (1762 – 96) had roots in the
Petrine era (1682 – 1725). In the 1730s, Russia remained a site of both pan-European
confessional cross-fertilization and strife as Russia integrated the Baltic Germans, and
Germanophone advisors negotiated for the Russian court’s interest, and their own
commitment to the “Protestant Interest.”

7

Recent historiography has shifted away from the notion that Peter the Great’s
church reforms coincided with a secularization of court culture.12 Robert Collis
contributes to what has emerged as a major shift in Petrine studies, dislocating the tsar's
image as a "rational," "Enlightenment"-espousing paradigm-shifter and emphasizing the
religious and esoteric aspects of Petrine court culture. Collis illustrates that astrology and
alchemy interested Peter's courtiers, clergy, and the tsar and shows that "mystical,
eschatological and esoteric views" became influential before the Masonic and
Rosicrucian influences penetrated during Catherine II's reign.13 He reveals that Peter was
continually associated with Biblical figures rhetorically and through visual
representations, and that in creating St. Petersburg as the "new Jerusalem," he took on a
Davidic role and drew on European notions of a Christian utopia.14 Collis focuses
especially on two British Jacobite companions of Peter’s who heavily influenced the
development of Russia’s mining and printing as well as the institution of the botanical
garden and kunstkamera, which would become aspects of the Academy of Sciences.
Additionally, he examines Stefan Iavorskii and Feofan Prokopovich, who influenced
Peter’s church reforms and crafted religiously-centered rhetoric. Jesuits with an interest
in astrology and mysticism influenced Iavorskii.15 This influence might have been
evident in a pamphlet written by Iavorskii, and published through the Kiev Academy in
1728, called The Rock of Faith, an anti-Protestant attack on Feofan Prokopovich that also
provided a "veiled exposition of the Catholic doctrine of the two powers, of the

12

See Ernest A. Zitser, The Transfigured Kingdom: Sacred Parody and Charismatic Authority at the Court
of Peter the Great, Studies of the Harriman Institute Columbia University, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2004).
13
Robert Collis, The Petrine Instauration: Religion, Esotericism and Science at the Court of Peter the
Great, 1689-1725 (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2012), 31-32.
14
Ibid., 385.
15
Ibid., 214.
8

superiority of the spiritual power of the church over secular authority."16 In contrast to
these Catholic influences, Collis argues that Prokopovich's worldview was informed by
Pietism, "an Orthodox faith based on the writings of Eastern church fathers,” and “an
esoteric worldview that embraced eclectic elements of Aristotelianism, Christian NeoPlatonism and Hermeticism.”17 Rather than a rational, scientific motivation, in
Prokopivich's thought Collis sees an "Early Modern expression of eclecticism that
incorporated Reformed Protestant chiliasm and Biblical exegesis, the distinct mysticism
of early Eastern Church Fathers and a continuing belief in occult correspondences and
powers."18 Clearly, Petrine elite culture, and religious reform and rhetoric, integrated
wider European cultural/religious threads and conflicts.
During Peter I’s reign, this pan-European religious conflict manifested in Johann
Franz Buddeas’ Ecclesia Romana cum ruthenica irreconciliabilis, published in Latin in
the German town of Jena in 1719. The tract defended Peter I’s right to reform his
church.19 During France’s Jansenist controversy, the Sorbonne published a memoir
justifying the king’s independence from all powers and parties except God and promoting
the union of the Catholic and Orthodox churches.20 Peter visited the Sorbonne himself in
1717 during his second trip to Western Europe and received a copy of the memoir.
According to James Cracraft, Buddeas rigorously countered the union-related aspects of
the Sorbonne memoir “from a rationalistic and Protestant point of view.” Further,
Cracraft notes, “amidst the flattering references to Tsar Peter and the violent diatribes
16

Ibid., 41. Paul Bushkovitch claims that under Iavorskii, “a sort of Baroque semi-Catholic spirituality
became predominant in the Russian church, lasting until midcentury,” in Religion and Society in Russia
(New York: Oxford University press, 1992), 239. As we shall see below, however, Lutheran influence
supplanted Catholic/Baroque influence before midcentury.
17
Ibid., 272.
18
Ibid.
19
See James Cracraft, The Church Reform of Peter the Great (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd, 1971), 47.
20
Ibid., 44.
9

against the Roman church, one can detect the central thread of Buddeus’s argument: Peter
ought not to surrender his supremacy over the church to the pope of Rome.”21 It seems as
though this tract potentially inflamed Lutherans, Catholics on all sides of the Jansenist
controversy, and the Orthodox.
This debate was evoked at the Russian court and in Central Europe in the early
1730s. On October 7, 1732, Rondeau reported that many Russian clergy had been “taken
up of late and sent to the castle of this place, among whom are two archbishops,” but he
did not know why.22 A week later he wanted to discuss the prospective Anglo-Russian
commercial treaty with Baron Osterman, but the latter had been tasked with heading a
commission interrogating two archbishops and the Russian clergy about the
dissemination of “seditious” letters about Anna and her cabinet, as well as a religious
tract published in Vienna.23 After one of the letters was discovered in the great hall of the
court, Anna issued a decree declaring that anyone finding another must burn it without
reading.24 Additionally, the Duke of Illyria, who had served as Spain’s resident at the
court, had allowed his chaplain, Father Rivera, to print a book in Vienna called Examen
Veri written in collaboration with clergy in St. Petersburg to defend the Orthodox Church
against the Buddeus tract.25 In addition to defending the Orthodox church, the
publication generated “the most scandalous reﬂexions that can be made against the
lutherans and calvinists.”26 Rondeau continued, “this spanish priest, not satisﬁed with
refuting Budeus, has made several reﬂections foreign to his subject in trying to shew the
21

Ibid., 47.
Russkoe istoricheskoe obshchestvo, Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66 (St.
Petersburg: Obshchestvo, 1891), 522.
23
Ibid., 535.
24
Ibid., 523-524.
25
Rondeau reported that when the tract was originally published during Peter I’s reign, he forbade the
Orthodox clergy to defend it.
26
Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66, 524.
22
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greek church was in danger of being ruined by the lutherans, since the most considerable
employments of this empire are given to foreigners of that persuasion.”27 Thus, the
dissemination of these “seditious letters” at court and Examen Veri’s publication in
Vienna, saturated the court with evocations of Lutherans ruining the Orthodox Church, as
well as conflict over Lutherans’ influence.
That propaganda evoking conflicts from the early decades of the century emerged
in the 1730s and associated the “German” Russian court with Lutheranism reveals
ongoing religious tensions within and outside Russia as well as resentment of “foreign”
influence within Russia.28 Examen Veri had the potential to inflame passions on a variety
of levels. First, it defended the Russian Orthodox Church against Lutherans and attacked
both Calvinists and Lutherans specifically, potentially raising denominational passions
against Russians and Orthodoxy. Second, its portrayal of Russia as dominated by
Lutherans could have alienated Catholics in the HRE at a time when the emperor
depended upon Russia’s military assistance. We shall see below that Protestants in
Austria and Poland faced forced migration and church demolition in 1732, the same year
the Duke of Illyria published Examen Veri. As copies circulated in 1733, did readers
consider Russia an oppressive, Lutheran force attempting to control Poland? How would
Catholics respond to an evocation of the Jansenist controversy and/or consider the
Russian alliance with the emperor? Next, Orthodox Christians living outside of Russia,

27

Ibid.
By contrast, the French editor of an Italian officer’s anti-Russian tract Muscovian Letters emphasized
Anna’s captivity under foreign domination, but not the Lutheran issue. The French edition was published
in Paris in 1735 and an English version in 1736. The British editor retained the original introduction.
Though a more comprehensive survey of anti-Russian European tracts is necessary, this suggests that the
religious issue did not offer as much propaganda value in France or Britain as it did in Austria. See
William Musgrave, Muscovian letters. Containing An Account of the Form of Government, Customs, and
Manners of that great Empire. Written By an Italian Officer of Distinction. Translated from the French
Original, Printed at Paris 1735 (London, 1736), iv – vi.
28
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in non-Orthodox lands, might have perceived the current regime as unwilling or unfit to
protect them. Finally, identification of the foreign yoke oppressing Russians during
Anna’s reign as specifically Lutheran, as opposed to “German,” adds a confessional
dimension to the commonly circulated complaint that Russia suffered under foreign
domination during the 1730s.29
Ernst Johann Biron, the figure most associated with Anna’s “German Yoke,”
became integral to Anna’s court while she served as duchess of the German-speaking
Duchy of Courland.30 When Peter the Great I renewed the medieval Rus practice of
securing dynastic marriages with Western European courts, Anna, the daughter of his
deceased half-brother Ivan V (r. 1682 – 1696), married the Duke of Courland, nephew to
the King of Prussia.31 The wedding took place in 1710, not long after Peter’s soldiers had
expelled the Swedes from the duchy during the Great Northern War. Unfortunately, on
the way home from their wedding in St. Petersburg, Anna's husband died (apparently as a
result of alcohol poisoning brought on by Peter’s demanding celebration regimen), and
his uncle, Ferdinand, became duke. Due to the war and conflict with the Courland

29

Buddeus’ work would also circulate in Russia in the late eighteenth century. Victoria Frede indicates that
another tract, Theses theologicae de atheism et supersitione (1716), was published twice during Catherine
II’s reign in 1774 and attributed to the above-mentioned Feofan Prokopovich. She indicates that early in the
eighteenth century apologetic works that defended Christianity against real or imagined enemies began to
be imported. Frede focuses on publications from the late eighteenth century, however, and refers to the
fluid boundaries among Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism as emblematic of that time. We have
seen, however, that the same intermingling occurred in Russia in the early part of the century. Catherine II,
a German Lutheran who converted to Orthodoxy, embarked on social reforms associated with Baltic
German Pietism. See Frede, 133-34. According to Curtiss, 140, during Peter II’s reign (1727-1730),
Markel Radishchevski, an archimandrite from a Novgorod monastery, denounced Prokopovich, in part on
charges of Augustinism and Lutheranism.
30
Edward C. Thaden and Marianna Forster Thaden, Russia's Western Borderlands, 1710-1870 (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 6.
31
Courland sits in the southwest corner of present-day Latvia. On Kievan Rus dynastic marriages with
Western Europeans, see Christian Raffensperger’s Reimagining Europe: Kievan Rus’ in the Medieval
World, 988-1146 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
12

gentry, the new duke remained in Danzig.32 Anna lived in the duchy's capital, Mitava,
until she ascended to the Russian throne in 1730.33 She maintained a presence in
Courland because Russia had no other claim to the duchy; despite Sweden's occupation,
it still remained under the protection of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.34 Biron, a
non-noble, entered Anna’s service in approximately 1714 and reportedly quickly became
her favorite and the most prominent member of her Courland court. To "ward off
scandal," she found a poor nobleman who would marry his daughter to Biron and the new
couple moved into the Duchess' palace, occupying rooms that adjoined her apartments.35
They reportedly lived in a similar arrangement when Anna became Empress in 1730 until
her death in 1740.
Biron was not the only of Anna’s “German” advisors. Elites such as the
Levenwolde brothers from Livonia, a German-speaking area removed from Swedish
control during the Great Northern War, played a prominent role in Anna’s diplomacy and
foreign policy. Additionally, Heinrich von Osterman grew up in a Westphalian Lutheran
pastor's family and joined his brother (who served as Anna Ivanovna and her sister's
tutor) in Russia in 1697. After he proved instrumental in negotiating the Peace of Nystad
in 1710, Peter I chose for Osterman a Russian wife.36 Pavel Iaguzhinskii, a Lithuanian,
served as organist for the Moscow Lutheran church and became the first Procurator

32

Hans Bagger, "The role of the Baltic in Russian foreign policy, 1721-1773," in Imperial Russian Foreign
Policy, ed. by Hugh Ragsdale and V. N. Ponomarev (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1993), 43.
33
John P. Ledonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and
Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 29.
34
Bagger, 43.
35
Alexander V. Berkis, The History of the Duchy of Courland (1561-1795) (Towson, Maryland: The Paul
M. Harrod Company, 1969), 222.
36
All of this information on Osterman comes from John P. LeDonne, "Ruling Families and the Russian
Political Order, 1689-1825," Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, 28 no. 3/4 (1987): 298.
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General of the Senate.37 With the exception of Osterman, these individuals were “Baltic
Germans,” hailing from German-speaking territories that had been under Swedish control
until the Great Northern War. While these men disagreed with one another and (in the
case of Osterman and Biron at least) maintained various allegiances to foreign courts,
they shared Lutheran roots. It is also worth noting that Catherine I, Peter I’s second wife
and successor, met Peter as a result of living in lands occupied by Russian forces during
the Great Northern War (in 1703 or 1704), and converted to Orthodoxy either from
Lutheranism or Catholicism.38
As a result of the Treaty of Nystadt, Baltic German nobles retained special,
autonomous judicial, administrative, land/peasant control, educational and religious
rights in areas with tightly controlled landed estates and highly lucrative trading cities
such as Riga.39 The territories were divided into the corporations of Livland, Estland and
the Island of Osel; Courland would not become integrated into the Russian Empire until
1795 as an outcome of the partitions of Poland. As mentioned above, Baltic Germans
maintained a disproportionate influence over elite institutions within Russia through the
nineteenth century. Moreover, they were a powerful constituency that held religious
autonomy: the Lutheran church remained the official church in this area and Swedish
church law stayed in effect until 1832.40 Thus, as an aspect of Russia’s Baltic conquests
and integration of Baltic German elites, Lutherans, and to some degree Lutheranism,
became woven into Russian institutions and court culture. A wedding that took place in
37
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St. Petersburg in May of 1733 provides an example of this integration. When a MajorGeneral Bismarck married Biron’s sister-in-law in a Lutheran church, Rondeau reported
that all of the foreign ministers and “almost all the court were present at church, and, after
the ceremony was over, we had the honour to dine at court. At night there was a ball."41
While the court and nobility would attend Orthodox Church services on Saints’ Days, or
for other official celebrations, they were also expected to attend a Lutheran wedding.
This contrasts sharply with the treatment of Prince Mikhail Golitsyn, who married
an Italian Catholic woman in Rome after converting in 1729 and attempted to keep the
event a secret when he returned to Moscow early in Anna’s reign. When the secret was
discovered, Anna subjected him to ritual humiliation, making him a cupbearer who
served the fermented beverage kvass to the Empress at court. In legal documents Prince
Golitsyn was then forced to use the name “Prince Kvassnik.” Anna demoted him from an
infantry major to a page, and she forced him to sit in a giant nest and imitate a hen in
front of the entire court. The Golitsyns were out of favor at this time, soon after
attempting to force Anna to submit to the “conditions” that she rejected upon becoming
empress. A kinsman supposedly reported the marriage to the court, however, revealing
that Golitsyns were not singled out solely for their family affiliation.42 Catholicism was
clearly unacceptable while Lutheranism was officially supported.
Biron’s access, as a Courlander rather than a Baltic German from annexed lands,
derived from his role as a favorite. While Biron did not use every opportunity to leverage
his position to his advantage, he profited handsomely from his level of influence,
obtaining estates in Siberia, Ukraine and Livonia, and using negotiations during The War
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of the Polish Succession to secure the position of Duke of the Duchy of Courland.43
Though his sense of superiority, proximity to the Empress, and wealth accumulation
understandably alienated many Russians, in Courland he enjoyed prestige and influence.
According to Alexander V. Berkis, "if he had behaved like a robber baron in Russia, he
had also been Courland's patriot. The first period of Biron's rule (1737-1740) was the
climax of Courland's prosperity during the eighteenth century.”44
Before Biron became Duke of Courland, his insecurity at the Russian court led
him to seek protection elsewhere. This passage from a report written by British diplomat
George Forbes to King George II (r. 1727 – 1760) in 1733-1734 reveals the diplomat’s
conception of Biron’s predicament in the year before Russia finally dispatched troops to
support the emperor:
Count Biron has thrown himself Intirely into the Emperours Interest, which he
Espouses on all Occasions as farr as it is consistent with his Duty to his
Sovereign. But as the Count, his Lady, and Family are Lutherans he seems rather
to wish for the Protection of some Protestant Power, and often Expresses himself
disatisfied with the Emperours little Regard for the Protestant Interest.45
Biron developed a close relationship with the British ambassadors at the Russian court
during this time, and often advocated Emperor Charles VI’s cause at their request, in
opposition to Prussia’s interests. If something should happen to the Empress, Biron’s
lack of popularity in Russia made it necessary to secure protection in other dominions,
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but he did not imagine surrendering his trust to the Catholic emperor, due to his disregard
for the “Protestant Interest.”46
What did it mean for Charles VI to disregard the “Protestant Interest” at this
particular time? With the exception of Andrew C. Thompson’s 2006 monograph,
Britain, Hanover and the Protestant Interest, 1688 – 1756, contemporary historians have
not focused on confessional dimensions of the Polish Succession crisis. Generally,
however, recent historiography has shifted away from the notion that warfare became
entirely “rationalized” and “secularized” after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.47 Pasi
Ihalainen contends that as the 1720s began, “the possibility of the outbreak of a religious
war between Catholics and Protestants in Germany was not yet out of the question” and
that “grounds for Protestant internationalism, at least in the form of sympathy toward the
persecuted brethren, were present until at least the Seven Years’ War,” and then declined
rapidly.48 He claims that solidarity with persecuted Protestants inspired relief efforts, but
especially united “Protestant members of a particular national community to defend their
church and country against the potential threat of the same horrors being experienced at
home.”49 Further, Sugiko Nishikawa refers to England in the early eighteenth century as
“a member of the European-wide Protestant community.”50 Though Biron may have
imagined himself as part of an international community of Protestants, he did not
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advocate uniformly for Protestant powers at court, most notably opposing Prussia’s
machinations.51 It seems likely that he wanted to retreat to a country where he had both
secured the sovereign’s favor and could practice his religion.
Well-publicized confessional strife in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to
Protestants’ sense of threat in the years leading up to the War of the Polish Succession.52
Thompson devotes a chapter to the Thorn crisis, a struggle between Jesuits and Lutherans
in Polish Prussia, which attracted international attention in 1724.53 Civil disorder broke
out over a dispute during a Catholic procession; both Catholics and Lutherans took
prisoners. As a result of Jesuit complaints to the Sejm, the town had to pay steep fines for
damage to Catholic property, fifteen people were publicly executed, and Catholics took
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over the last Protestant church in the town.54 Further, the archbishop of Salzburg had
evacuated 20,000-30,000 Protestants in 1732, and "the Emperor expressed his concern
over the persistence of pockets of Protestantism within the Austrian lands by forcibly
resettling a thousand Carinthians and Upper Austrians in Transylvania."55 Mack Walker
describes the Salzburg expulsion as “the most dramatic religious confrontation in
Germany after the Thirty Years’ War.”56 Adding further insult, by 1733 Protestants
could no longer participate in the Polish Sejm.57
Additionally, negotiations in the early 1730s, surrounding a successor of
Augustus II as king of Poland, evoked major setbacks faced by Protestants in 1697.
Then, Augustus II, elector of Saxony, converted from Lutheranism to Catholicism so that
he could claim the Polish throne, which particularly disillusioned Protestants who
remembered Saxony as "the birthplace of the Reformation."58 Simultaneous with
Augustus' conversion in 1697, the fourth clause of the Treaty of Ryswick (ending the
War of the League of Augsburg) allowed for churches that Catholics had claimed during
Louis XIV's decimation of the Palatinate to remain Catholic after the departure of French
troops.59 Thompson has demonstrated that overturning the Ryswick clause preoccupied
many Protestants within the Empire during the lead-up to The War of the Polish
Succession. He indicates, “the Peace of Westphalia had supposedly frozen the
confessional balance in the Reich and further changes were not allowed. Approval by the
Reich of the 1697 treaty therefore enabled a shift in the confessional balance that would
54
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not otherwise have been licit.”60 Protestants worried because this development made the
1648 Westphalia treaty, which set the number of Protestant and Catholic churches, seem
amendable rather than a fundamental of Imperial law.61 The issue raised “broader
implications beyond the local situation in the Palatinate. Protestants perceived an
increase in catholic power in the Empire.”62 On the other hand, W.R. Ward indicates that
Catholics believed "Westphalia itself was an act of force in which they had been pillaged
by the Protestants with foreign assistance from France and Sweden."63 Negotiations
surrounding the Treaty of Utrecht at the conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession in
1713 placed the fourth clause back on the table, but Pope Clement XI remained
unmoved.64 The Corpus Evangelicorum within the HRE had continually, unsuccessfully,
attempted to convince the Emperor to nullify the clause.65 Thompson contends that
Charles’ need for support from princes and electors in 1733 provided an opportunity for
Protestants to use revocation of the clause as a negotiating point.66 However, when
France attacked, they did not hold out until the emperor changed his mind about
Ryswick.67
Despite much hand wringing, the Protestant powers did not take definitive action
in support of Protestants in Poland. In 1731, the Prussian, English, Dutch and Russian

60

Ibid.
Ibid., 179.
62
Ibid.
63
W.R. Ward, The Protestant evangelical awakening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 18.
64
Ibid.
65
See Thompson, 179 and Peter H. Wilson, From Reich to Revolution, German History, 1558-1806 (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 151 on the Corpus. Protestants united as a Corpus Evangelicorum in
1712 to advocate for their rights in the Reichstag and "other imperial institutions." It "leveled the
distinctions between electors, princes, lords and cities, by grouping them in a single body."
66
See Thompson, 179 and Wilson, From Reich to Revolution, 151 on the Corpus. Protestants united as a
Corpus Evangelicorum in 1712 to advocate for their rights in the Reichstag and "other imperial
institutions." It "leveled the distinctions between electors, princes, lords and cities, by grouping them in a
single body."
67
Thompson, 187.
61

20

representatives at the Polish court had united to support religious dissidents. Russia and
Prussia also agreed to join together to support Orthodox and Protestant dissidents in
Warsaw.68 In July of 1733, however, Rondeau wrote to Lord Harrington, Secretary of the
Northern Department, indicating that the court considered Prussia an unreliable partner
and Empress Anna wanted to settle a treaty with George II “to secure for the future the
protestants of Poland in the free exercise of their religion.”69 The following week, Forbes
wrote to Harrington indicating that one of Anna’s advisors complained of Woodward’s
“reservedness in relation to the election of Poland,” appealing to “His Majesty's paternal
care” for dissidents there.70 In August, however, Harrington pointed out that, though
Anna’s minister had persisted in promoting a treaty of alliance, he dropped the notion of
entering into a treaty on behalf of Polish dissidents.71 Forbes explained that the issue was
not raised again because he insisted on George II’s “good offices” for them, carried out
by Woodward in Warsaw, and the impossibility of backing up such a treaty by sea or
land.72 In a private elaboration Harrington explained that George does not want to enter
into a treaty to protect Protestants because it might “exasperate [The Poles] more, and
make them eager to show their power and their freedom by some warm acts of bigotry.”73
Meanwhile, in Poland’s religiously charged atmosphere, George Woodward,
British envoy to Poland and Saxony, followed commands regarding advocacy for
Protestants in Warsaw as communicated by George II through Lord Harrington, Secretary
of the Northern Department. From the summer of 1732 to November of 1733, Harrington
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mixed concern for the fate of Polish Protestants with an emphasis on subduing fervent
reaction to the demolition of Protestant churches.74 George II encouraged Protestants to
seek redress for persecution, but eschewed entanglement in plots, and sought to prevent
violent responses.
The British also took this tempered approach in relations with Russia. Though
Britain sought neither a defensive nor a religious alliance with Russia, its envoys worked
tirelessly to settle a commercial treaty. Russia pressed for a defensive guarantee
continuously and Britain would not relent. Before the French had invaded the HRE,
when the emperor reneged on his treaty-mandated duty to dispatch troops to secure the
Polish election along with the Russians, British diplomats defused the issue, convincing
Biron that the emperor’s move would give the French a pretext to attack. Then, in
autumn 1734, when the emperor began asking for treaty-mandated Russian troop support
in his Rhineland territories, the Russians demurred. A triangulation emerged as Russia
stalled both in signing the commercial treaty and deploying troops to support the
emperor. Meanwhile, despite consistent pressure from Russia, the British avoided
entering into a defensive alliance with it and never committed to assisting the emperor
militarily.
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In late February 1735, Rondeau wrote to Harrington that the envoy from Vienna
continued, unsuccessfully, to pressure the Russians to send troops to Poland to assist the
emperor. He thought that Anna delayed not only to see whether George II would assist
the emperor, but also due to Biron’s displeasure over misrepresentations from Vienna
regarding his Silesian land purchase. Rondeau wrote that Biron had “bought of late the
county of Warttenberg in Silesia […] and when general count Levenvolde was last at
Vienna, that ministry as good as promised him that, in case count Biron bought the above
estate, he should be permitted to build a lutheran church at Warttenberg, which liberty the
emperor now refuses to grant, saying it is contrary to the laws of the country.” Rondeau
elaborated that because “nothing can be done here without his consent, the emperor must
find some way to satisfy him, or else his affairs will go on but very slowly at this
court.”75 Soon after, he reported rumors that the issue had been resolved as a result of
assurances that Charles VI would allow Biron to “build a lutheran church on estates he
has bought in Silesia…”76 Russia did deploy troops and a coin dated November 4, 1736
commemorates the consecration of Biron’s estate chapel.77 Biron's hindrance of the
Russo-Austrian troop deployment agreement does not appear in contemporary historical
accounts focusing specifically on the war, which portray the events following Charles'
request for troops as swift, or do not mention the delay.78
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While Rondeau indicates that Biron bought the land from the emperor,
correspondence reveals that the Silesian land had been used as a gift to influence a series
of notables at the Russian court. In late December of 1729, at the end of Peter II’s reign,
Rondeau expressed concern about the Duke of Illyria’s inability to counterbalance
Vienna at court because Emperor Charles VI planned to “give prince Alexey
Grigoriewitz Dolgoruky, the promised Czarinna’s father, the principality in Silesia that
did belong to prince Menshikoff and was the bribe which engaged that unfortunate
gentleman to do all that the court of Vienna desired at that time.”79 Prince Menshikov, a
favorite of Peter I who had taken control in the first months of Peter II’s reign, was
disgraced in large part due to Dolgorukii influence. Now, as Prince Dolgorukii’s
daughter planned to marry Peter II, he would receive the emperor’s gift. This reveals
Rondeau’s perception that this particular land grant was instrumental in Menshikov’s
allegiance to Vienna. As Peter II died soon after this dispatch, and the Dolgorukiis were
disgraced, the emperor no longer had a reason to curry Prince Dolgorukii’s favor.
Early into Anna’s reign, Biron became the most evident beneficiary of Emperor
Charles VI’s largesse. The dynamic shifted after Vienna and Britain became allies in
1731. Now, rather than expressing concern over the emperor’s ability to wield influence
with the land, Rondeau sought London’s assistance in bestowing it upon Biron. In late
September, near the end of the second year of Anna’s reign, Rondeau wrote to London

International Press, 1982), 162-163. Charles W. Ingrao attributes Russia’s late assistance with its
Preoccupation in Poland and distance from the empire, 146. Michael Hochedlinger does not address the
delay in Austria’s Wars of Emergence 1683-1797 (London: Longman, 2003), 205 - 209. General Manstein
noted the delay in his memoir: "the Emperor, Charles IV. [sic] had repeatedly urged to [Empress Anna
Ivanovna] his request of her sending succours to him on the Rhine.” Cristof Hermann Manstein and David
Hume, Memoirs of Russia, Historical, Political, and Military, from the Year MDCCXXVII, to MDCCXLIV
(London: Printed for T. Becket and P.A. De Hondt, 1770), 84. For our purposes, Manstein's recollection
serves as corroboration of events reported elsewhere.
79
Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66, 116.
24

that Vienna’s resident, Count Wratislau, asked him to send a dispatch requesting that the
British court “try to engage the court of Vienna to give count Biron the estates in Silesia
formerly designed for prince Menshikoff and at the same time to make him a prince of
the empire…” Rondeau was convinced that this action would “infallibly secure count
Biron in our interest.”80 Wratislau wanted it to appear as though Rondeau generated the
idea because he thought otherwise the emperor would look unfavorably on the
suggestion. Rondeau did not indicate that the action would secure Vienna’s interests
alone, but “our” interests: Britain’s and the Empire’s. On November 18, 1732 Rondeau
indicated, “Count Wratislau told me yesterday, that he had been informed from his court
that the emperor, his master, would give count Biron a considerable estate in Silesia,
which he had acquainted his excellency with, so that now he is sure the french will not be
able to do anything here.”81 Thus, Wratislau perceived that the land gift would prevent
Biron from becoming susceptible to French influence.
In 1735 Rondeau indicated that Biron purchased the land, whereas in 1732 he had
personally asked London to convince the court of Vienna to give it as a gift. It seems
most likely that few knew that Biron received the land as a gift. When Levenwolde
negotiated in Vienna over the church construction issue, he could easily have thought that
Biron purchased the land, as the courts likely did not want it known that the transaction
was designed to secure allegiance.
Although the emperor’s relenting to Biron seems to have caused the long-awaited
troop deployment, all of the circumstances related to this Austrian-British-Russian
triangulation resolved in February and March of 1735. On February 15, Rondeau

80
81

Sbornik Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva Volume 66, 508-509.
Ibid., 530.
25

reported Anna’s hesitation about deploying troops as though she awaited word on what
action George II would take to support the emperor.82 Within days, Rondeau received a
copy of a resolution between the States General and Britain regarding the war; Anna and
her ministers must also have received it around that time. On March 1, 1735, Rondeau
reported that Anna would send troops, Charles VI would allow Biron to build his church,
and the commercial treaty would finally be ratified. On March 16 Rondeau indicated that
Anna was pleased with the part of the accommodation plan relating to Poland, the treaties
were officially ratified, and within days Anna had dispatched orders for the deployment
of 20,000 troops.83 As discussed further in Chapter 2, the timing strongly suggests that in
lieu of a much sought-after defensive alliance Russia leveraged the Anglo-Russian
Commercial Treaty of 1734 for the resolution drafted by the States General, agreeing to
ratify the commercial treaty only after receiving the resolution. With those issues settled,
and Biron able to build his church on the land the British had helped him to obtain,
Russia then deployed troops. Biron’s side deal, then, seems to have been an aspect of
both the formal Austro-Russian alliance mandating the troop commitment as well as
indirect reciprocity among the three empires that allowed them to assist one another
without entering into official alliances that would further inflame hostilities.
That the church transaction did not rank in importance with the commercial and
military items that simultaneously resolved amplifies its significance. This is the only
time that the correspondence covering Anna’s reign, and collected in the Russkoe
istoricheskoe obshchestvo volumes, reveals that a British diplomat wrote to the king from
St. Petersburg requesting a quid-pro-quo favor for any individual. At a time when
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Charles VI undertook so much anti-Lutheran activity, allowing Biron to build a church
was apparently not worth securing the favorite’s allegiance. That it took the threat of
withholding the troops Charles so desperately needed to force him to relent reveals the
issue’s significance to the emperor.
After tensions in Poland subsided with Augustus’ victory secure, and plans began
for the Diet of Pacification in August of 1735, Russia took a measured approach toward
advocacy for Protestants. On August 2, Rondeau wrote that the Russian envoy in
Warsaw would join with Woodward to support Protestants at the Diet.84 On August 30,
Rondeau reported that he assured the Protestant representative from Warsaw at the
Russian court that Woodward would work in concert with the Russian envoy. He had
heard however, that the Russian minister was ordered “to take the greatest care not to
endanger the breaking of the diet…. by insisting too much on redressing the Protestant’s
[sic] grievances,” since Augustus would settle them in the next diet if they failed
initially.85 On September 6 Rondeau reported that the Danish and Prussian envoys had
urged Anna to attend to the Protestants but that some thought the Prussian king sought to
cause difficulty for the diet through such advocacy rather than provide relief. This
correspondence reveals that religious tensions continued to simmer as the Polish
succession crisis subsided and demonstrates awareness that religious issues could be
exploited to obstruct peace proceedings.
Unlike the princes and electors in the HRE who hoped to use overturning
Ryswick as leverage, Biron’s access at the Lutheran-friendly Russian court allowed him
to add one more Lutheran church to Silesia. Though Silesia had seen an increase in the
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number of Protestant churches subsequent to 1697, continued persecution of Silesian
Lutherans throughout the first half of the eighteenth century made them particularly
grateful for the assistance of Protestant powers. Pasi Ihalainen notes that before the
Swedish king Charles XII entered into the Altranstadt Treaty with the emperor during the
Great Northern War, allowing 120 churches to be returned to Protestants, “Lutheran
Silesians considered Charles XII a messianic figure who would come to their help.”86
Further, “the sufferings of Silesian Lutherans at the hands of the Counter-Reformation
made news in Protestant papers up to 1740, when Frederick the Great of Prussia put an
end to forced conversions of Lutheran parishes and earned himself the honorary title of a
defender of Protestantism.”87 Had the territory remained in Charles VI’s hands, Biron
might have become legendary as a defender of Protestantism. Instead, Frederick the
Great (r. 1740-86), the Protestant king of Prussia, annexed Silesia within a few years of
the church’s construction. The Prussian king’s boldness changed Silesia’s trajectory and
launched Europe into the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), rendering Biron’s
feat unworthy of even a footnote in English-language historiography. In the years before
Frederick’s annexation, however, the impact could have been significant. In Wartenberg,
the county Biron received, the last church in which Protestants had been allowed to
worship burned down in 1637 and many of the congregation who could not receive
permission to reconstruct emigrated.88 Under the permit he received, nobles and
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townspeople could attend services.89 Thus, though Biron played a small, and largely
unacknowledged, role in restoring Lutheran worship in Silesia, to Lutherans in
Wartenberg who could now worship locally, Biron may have seemed as heroic as Charles
XII or Frederick the Great.
Considering these two incidents, the Buddeus refutation and Biron’s Silesian
church construction, has allowed us to see that the Russian court remained a site of
interdenominational convergence and conflict in the 1730s. During the lead-up to the
War of the Polish Succession, Europe confronted dynastic changes that evoked religious
tensions from decades earlier in the century while areas of Central and Eastern Europe
encountered forced relocation of Lutherans and Protestant church destruction. At the
same time, the publication of the refutation of Buddeus in Vienna evoked the contentious
period of Peter I’s church reforms as well as the Jansenist controversy. During Peter I’s
reign, as influential Baltic Germans became integrated into the elite as a result of the
Great Northern War, Peter wrested autonomy from his church and created a new blend of
sacral authority among the elite. Accusations of Lutheran sympathies emerged during
Peter’s time and bubbled up again through the Buddeus refutation as Baltic Germans
became prominent during Anna Ivanovna’s reign. While Russia remained officially
Orthodox and the court adhered to Orthodox devotional ceremonial rites, Lutherans were
integrated enough into the court that a favorite could used the empire’s leverage to ensure
that a Lutheran church would be constructed on land he received to do a foreign power’s
bidding. We see that in the 1730s Russia remained a locus of interdenominational crossfertilization and conflict, integrated into the interdenominational struggles across Europe.
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Recognizing the “Lutheran Yoke” had roots in Peter’s reign, and that Catherine II’s
reforms are associated with her Pietism, points the way toward future work on the role of
religion in elite integration and cultural transfer throughout eighteenth century Russia.
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Though Russia sought Britain’s military assistance against the French in the War
of the Polish Succession (1733-35), it could not use contemporaneous commercial treaty
negotiations as leverage to induce the British to enter into a formal defensive alliance.90
In his 1938 monograph on the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734, Douglas K.
Reading attributed Russia’s capitulation to the treaty without the guarantee to “the real
dependence of the new Russian economic organism upon English commerce.”91 For
Reading, the proof of this dependence lay in “the successful conclusion of the
commercial treaty by the English notwithstanding their outright rejection of Muscovite
political advances.”92 This notion of Russia’s dependence fit with Reading’s contention
that the treaty represented “the first formal commercial agreement ever concluded
between, on the one side, the most industrially and commercially advanced of all the
contemporary European states, Great Britain, and on the other side, the most backward
and undeveloped of these same states, Russia."93 The Russian/East European
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“backwardness” trope has not disappeared since the 1930s, and contemporary work on
the treaty negotiations emphasizes, as Reading did, individual statespersons’ goals and
the failure of Anna Ivanovna’s chancellor Baron von Osterman to insist on a reciprocal
guarantee.94 That the British did not offer a reciprocal defensive guarantee, however, did
not reflect Britain’s superior diplomatic maneuvering. Simultaneous with the treaty’s
ratification in early 1735, the British and Holland’s States General negotiated with the
French to secure an agreement that ended the most intensive phase of Russia’s
involvement in the War of the Polish Succession. Thus, Russia obtained its desired
outcome without a formal alliance. Soon after, the British desperately sought a defensive
alliance with Russia but the court demurred throughout the rest of Anna Ivanovna’s reign.
Thus, Russia did not abandon its hopes for a defensive alliance because its new,
westward-looking “economic organism” depended upon Britain.
Along with this conception of Russian dependence, contemporary explanations
for the commencement of formal trade relations with Britain during Anna Ivanovna’s
reign have focused on the “old” Russian nobility’s displacement by a new, Westernlooking elite.95 More than a relatively simple issue of “old” and “backward” vs. “new”
and “Western,” British and Russian factional issues mixed with dynastic and strategic
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considerations to impede a formal commercial agreement in the decades before Anna
Ivanovna’s reign. The “Old Russian” nobility were not anti-western and many, in fact,
preferred the British to “Germans” at court. Aside from to the resolution of factional and
territorial/strategic issues related to the Duke of Holstein’s claim on Schleswig, the factor
that most contributed to Russia’s formalization of commercial relations was Britain’s
détente with Austria, Russia’s primary ally, in 1731.96 That Russia engaged in formal
relations with Britain and then leveraged the commercial treaty for Britain’s and the
States General’s resolution of the Polish Succession crisis reveals that Russia acted
strategically based on its current alliances and defensive needs rather than overcoming its
“backward” isolation in the wake of Peter the Great’s reforms.
An overview of Russo-British relations during the first part of the eighteenth
century will provide context for the renewal of Anglo-Russian relations during Anna
Ivanovna’s reign.97 English and British sovereigns consistently and unsuccessfully
pressed for the conclusion of a commercial treaty throughout the first two decades of the
eighteenth century as Russia gained a position of strength through its conquests in the
Great Northern War. From at least 1705, Queen Anne sought such a treaty, using
admittance into the Grand Alliance as leverage in 1707, and making additional overtures
in 1711 and 1715. George I would continue to pursue a treaty of commerce from 1716 to
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1720, at which time, as Russia had obtained a more advantageous strategic position, Peter
I consistently used entry into a defensive alliance as leverage.98
Britain’s factional issues also impacted Russia’s approach to the British. As a
result of its new supremacy over Sweden, in 1718 Russia replaced that nation as the
Jacobites’ focus for foreign support. While two of Peter’s closest friends and advisors
actively advocated for the Jacobite cause, and in 1719 there had reportedly been talk of
his supporting the Duke of Holstein’s bid for the Swedish throne and an effort to
reestablish Jacobite rule in England through a Scottish invasion, Peter continually
reaffirmed his lack of Jacobite interest in diplomatic correspondence with the English
court.99 When open hostilities emerged in 1720, in the form of a military challenge from
the English in the Baltic, Peter assured merchants that he “[did] not condescend to blame
the English people for this measure, but only the Hanoverians and their party.”100 After
many protestations about Russia's lack of participation in Jacobite intrigue, this openly
anti-Hanoverian rhetoric marks a distinct shift.
In 1724, the Duke of Holstein married Catherine I’s and Peter’s daughter, Anna
Petrovna. After Catherine I's ascension upon Peter's death in 1725 we see continuity in
factional influence and a more pronounced alliance between the Russian sovereign and
the Jacobite cause. In 1725, Europe divided into an alliance between Austria and Spain
on the one hand, and the Hanover Alliance of Britain, France, the United Provinces, and
Prussia on the other. Davies indicates that "Russia as well as Austria had reason to fear
the Hanover League, seeing it as an instrument by which Britain could block Russian
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interests in the Baltic" and Prussia could induce Sweden to join.101 Catherine I openly
supported her son-in-law's Swedish monarchical aims and became involved in
international Jacobite plotting. 102 It is difficult to know what to make of these reports of
factional alliances at the Russian court as the conflicting information could have emerged
as an effect of disinformation, dissimulation, or misunderstanding. Thus, while
supporting the Duke of Holstein clearly coincided with Catherine I's advocating the
Jacobite cause, it is difficult to discern the level of commitment within the rest of the
Russian court. Catherine I's death in May of 1727 seemingly ended Russia's official
support of the Jacobites. Meanwhile, George II claimed the English crown months later,
reaffirming Hanoverian legitimacy and extinguishing Jacobite hopes.
By August of 1728 England had dispatched Thomas Ward and Claudius Rondeau
to St. Petersburg to attend to British trade issues, but as the envoys remained concerned
primarily with wresting military textile contracts from the Prussians, they were unable to
effect an entente between Britain and Russia.103 This was during the short reign of young
Peter II (r. 1727-1730) who spent his minority first under Menshikov and then the
Dolgorukii and Golitsyn families. As the Golitsyn and Dolgorukii families took control,
the court returned to Moscow in early 1728, indicating a major break with symbolic and
practical aspects of the Petrine legacy.104 This has been portrayed as a “backwards” or
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reactionary move and the Dolgorukiis especially have often been referred to as
xenophobic.105 A regime change in Russia soon followed when Anna Ivanovna became
empress early in 1730. Then, in 1731, Russia minimized the threat to British interests in
the Baltic by disallowing a potential heir to the Russian throne from controlling the duchy
of Holstein.106 Additionally, in 1731 the British and Austrians reconciled through the
second Treaty of Vienna. Later that year, at the suggestion of the Austrian envoy to St.
Petersburg, the College of Foreign Affairs indicated that it would resume official
diplomatic relations with Britain.107 By the summer of 1732 Baron von Osterman began
discussing the possibility of a commercial treaty with a defensive guarantee.
This overview of early-eighteenth-century Anglo-British relations reveals that a
number of factional and geostrategic considerations prevented the nations from seriously
deliberating about a commercial agreement from 1720 to 1732. Prior to that time, while
the British court sought a trade agreement, Peter I continually used the need for a
reciprocal defensive alliance as leverage. Philip Clendenning’s analysis, on the other
hand, does not address factionalism and geostrategic considerations, characterizing the
transformation that took place in Russo-British relations from the conclusion of the Great
Northern War in 1721 to the 1740s as possible due to a broad social transformation.108
According to Clendenning, Peter I’s “new aristocracy” displaced the “old conservative
aristocratic families,” including the Dolgorukiis and Golitsyns, who in this period are
most well known for attempting to impose the famous “Conditions” on Anna when the
105

John P. Le Donne, "Ruling Families and the Russian Political Order, 1689-1825," in Cahiers du
Monde russe et soviétique, 28 no. 3/4 (1987): 296.
106
Brian Davies, Empire and Military Revolution In Eastern Europe: Russia's Turkish Wars in the
Eighteenth Century (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011),165. Russia signed a
treaty recognizing Karl Friedrich's giving up his claim to Schleswig in exchange for compensation for
Holstein.
107
Reading, 99.
108
See, for example, Le Donne, "Ruling Families.”
36

nobility chose her to rule after Peter II’s death.109 We saw, in actuality, that Peter I’s
insistence on a defensive alliance, Jacobite sympathies, and outright Jacobite advocacy,
prevented the Russian and British courts first from entering into a commercial agreement
and then from engaging in any sort of diplomacy from 1720-28, with the Austro-British
alliance providing the opportunity for a renewal of formal relations in 1731.
Clendenning relies upon the diplomatic correspondence of Edward Finch, who
replaced Claudius Rondeau as resident at the Russian court after his untimely death, near
the end of Anna Ivanovna’s reign, in 1739. Finch wrote that the Old Rus showed no
interest in a commercial treaty with a European nation but rather wanted to continue to
favor “Asiatics.”110 As Britain had already entered into the commercial treaty of 1734 at
this time, Clendenning might have been referring to the renewal of the treaty in 1742.
Since Clendenning has identified a wide scale Petrine social transformation with Russia’s
readiness to enter into a commercial agreement, however, examining what the nobility
expressed during Rondeau’s early years in Russia, prior to commencement of the
negotiations over the 1734 treaty, should tell us more than what Finch observed in the
early 1740s. Rondeau made many observations about the Old Rus that counter
assumptions about their association with “backwardness.” Rondeau’s Old Rus often
preferred the British to “German” interests and considered it beneficial to maintain
friendly relations with them.
According to Rondeau, the Old Rus were friendly to Mecklenburg and in
opposition to the Dolgorukiis. During Peter II’s reign, Rondeau mentioned that the "old
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rus nobility" wanted to see the young tsar marry the daughter of the Duke of
Mecklenburg instead of a Dolgorukii.111 This is significant because Rondeau
characterized the Old Rus in opposition to the Dolgorukiis who are conventionally seen
as bastions of backwardness and xenophobia. Second, these Old Rus preferred dynastic
marriage to a Western foreigner over a Russian noble.
Rondeau also portrayed the Old Rus as friendly to the British and in opposition to
the Courlanders and Germans. When Rondeau first mentioned Ernst Johann Biron on
May 11, 1730, he noted that many from Courland were in favor at court, which
displeased the “old rus.”112 Soon after, Rondeau noted, "all the old russ are our friends
and begin to murmur very much, that Her Majesty has so many courlanders and germans
about her person.”113 Thus, the Old Rus did not dislike foreigners in general, as they
preferred the British, but disliked the disproportionate number of people in Anna’s court
from the Duchy of Courland and other Germanophone areas. This suggests that even
without the disproportionate influence of Germanophone advisors, the Russian nobility
would have accepted a commercial treaty with Britain in subsequent years.
Rondeau also indicated that the Old Rus disliked Austria and Baron von
Osterman. As this was prior to the Anglo-Austrian détente in 1731, Britain still worked
against Austria’s interests at the Russian court. When the Dutch envoy arrived at St.
Petersburg, Rondeau stated, "He will, I don't doubt, join with us to weaken the emperor's
interest at this court, which is yet very considerable, though he has all the old russ against
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him.”114 Rondeau also thought that Osterman, who engineered the alliance with Austria,
might have been afraid that he would be unable to persuade the Old Rus to meet Russia’s
troop deployment obligation to Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI (r. 1711-1740) in case
of war.115 Rondeau elaborated that Paul Ivanovitch Iaguzhinskii and others of the Old
Rus nobility had tried to lessen Osterman's power, and described him as "almost the only
person who… supported the german interest in this country since the going away of the
duke of Holstein."116 Thus, the Old Rus disliked Osterman, Austria, and “the German
interest.”
Though the Golitsyns have been associated with the “backwards” retreat to
Moscow during Peter II’s reign, and the attempt to impose conditions upon Anna when
she took power, Rondeau described one of the clan as a friend to Britain. When Field
Marshal Golitsyn died, Rondeau noted his passing as regretted by Anna and the army and
then described him as "a very honest old russ, incapable to be bribed, seeking always the
real advantage of this country, and consequently our friend."117 Thus, an Old Rus from a
notoriously “backward” family saw that it was best for his country to ally with Britain.
Rondeau then described the frustration of the Old Rus nobility as a result of their
exclusion from Anna’s confidence. Rondeau indicated that Biron, the Levenwolde
brothers, Paul Ivanovitch Iaguzhinskii, and Osterman had the most access and
influence.118 Iaguzhinskii, the Old Rus, was the only among this crew who was Britain’s
“real friend,” as Vienna and Prussia had bribed Biron and Count Levenwolde. This made
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Rondeau fear that Anna would send 20,000 troops to Vienna per the 1726 defensive
alliance with Russia, and act that he thought might make the Old Rus openly rebel.119
We have seen, then, that in Rondeau’s nomenclature, the Old Rus revealed a
variety of overlapping and contradictory characteristics. Without becoming mired in
factional issues it is possible to say that there were Russian elites who favored diplomatic
and commercial relations with the British over “Germans.” Yet, it was the “Germans”
who oversaw negotiations for the Anglo-Russian Commercial treaty of 1734. Clearly it
is difficult to generalize about what constituted Russian “backwardness” in terms of who
favored ties with the West. This summation of Anglo-British relations and examination
of Rondeau’s categorization of the Old Rus certainly reveals that we cannot consider the
renewal of diplomatic and commercial ties with Britain as the result of forward-moving,
Petrine progress.
A closer look at the Golitsyn and Dolgorukii families reveals that, though they
have been associated with “backwardness,” they maintained long-term contact with the
West. LeDonne describes the Dolgorukiis as "very conservative, xenophobic, and
extremely devout despite their unbearable pride," noting that the clan's proximity to the
opposition that had gathered around tsarevitch Alexis in 1718 had caused their political
fortunes to suffer.120 The combination of the return to Moscow during Peter II’s minority
and LeDonne's portrayal of isolation and religious devotion feeds into constructions of
the Petrine/Muscovite divide into progressive vs. backward. It is true that the
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Dolgorukiis were noted to have resisted the Petrine reforms in dress.121 However, the
family also boasted a long record of foreign service. First Grigory Dolgorukii and then
his son Sergei served as envoys to Warsaw, the only court at which Russia posted
residents before Peter's reign. Vasily Lukich Dolgorukii studied in France for over a
decade before postings in Warsaw and then Denmark in 1707, and was also posted in
Sweden.122 The family served in the Russian senate from its inception.123
The Golitsyns also boasted a history of foreign service, as well as state
appointments. Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn visited Rome, Naples and Venice, where
he studied military-defensive topics. In 1707 he received the appointment of Voyevoda
of Kiev, the cultural and intellectual capital of Russia, and would become Kiev's
governor and the lieutenant of Smolensk.124 The area reflected a combination of "Latin,
Roman and Catholic influence," as well as a mixture of Polish political traditions and
Lithuanian legal statutes.125 During his time in Kiev, Golitsyn surrounded himself by
scholars and arranged for translations of texts for Kiev Academy students (primarily from
French and Polish), at his own behest and on Peter I’s behalf.126 Further, he received an
appointment to the new College of Revenues in 1719.127 De Madariaga also tells us that
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the Golitsyn family was well liked in Ukraine, where they held estates, and surmises that
the restoration of the Hetmanate in 1728 (while the Dolgorukiis and Golitsyns were in
control during Peter II’s minority) after Peter's elimination of it in 1722 demonstrates
sympathy for Ukrainian traditions.128
That neither of these families seems to have had significant Germanophone or
British ties, but linkages to the Ukraine, Poland and France, might explain why they were
considered “backward” during a time when Russia was at war with Poland and France.
The Golitsyns, especially, maintained extensive connections in areas that had been
annexed by Muscovy in the mid-late-eighteenth century. Yet, as we saw above, Rondeau
described Field Marshal Golitsyn as sympathetic to the British. Again, there do not seem
to have been straightforward divisions that we can attribute to Old and New Rus.
Now we shall move on to the significance of Russia’s concluding the 1734 treaty
without a defensive guarantee, which, as we saw above, was contrary to the Petrine
legacy of insisting on a reciprocal defensive guarantee. Michael Bitter explores this issue
in a manner similar to Douglas Reading’s in 1938, examining the treaty negotiations in
detail and comparing the approaches of Osterman and Biron.129 Bitter demonstrates that
in an era known variously as the “Bironovschina” (time of Biron’s rule) or Russia’s era
under the “German Yoke,” these two Germanophone advisors took very different
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approaches and Biron did not uniformly dominate.130 Biron did not advocate a defensive
alliance and eventually his approach won out. Bitter indicates that Osterman, defeated,
“adopted his rivals' attitude toward the commercial treaty… and the Russian court settled
for a policy of strictly commercial engagement with Great Britain.”131 This analysis
focuses our attention on personal approaches and preferences of statespersons and
portrays one strategy as overriding another, with Russia “settling” due to pressure from
Britain and a willingness of some at court to acquiesce.
Examining the correspondence from February and March of 1735, however,
demonstrates that Russia did not simply capitulate to Britain’s demands. While the treaty
was concluded in December of 1734, it was not ratified until a few months later, and its
ratification coincided with a number of significant events. Per its 1726 alliance with
Austria, Russia was obligated to assist the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI when the
French attacked his territories as part of the War of the Polish Succession. He had
repeatedly asked for assistance and Russia delayed. Meanwhile, Russia had committed
significant ground forces to securing its installation of the new king Augustus III in
Poland. Though Britain and Austria had reconciled by this time, while Hanover
committed troops to assist the Emperor Charles VI, Britain did not. On February 15,
Rondeau reported Anna’s hesitation about deploying troops as though she awaited word
on what action George II might take to support the emperor as the British king.132 Within
days, Rondeau received a copy of a resolution drafted by Holland’s States General and
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Britain indicating that the French-supported, rival claimant to the Polish throne would
retreat, after which Russia would remove its troops; Anna and her ministers must also
have received it around that time. With Anna able to remove her troops to Poland, she
had the capacity to comfortably assist the emperor. On March 1, 1735, Rondeau reported
that Anna would send troops, Charles VI would allow Biron to build a Lutheran church
on land within the HRE granted to him by the emperor, and the commercial treaty would
finally be ratified.133 On March 16 Rondeau indicated that Anna was pleased with the
part of the accommodation plan relating to Poland, the treaties were officially ratified,
and within days Anna had dispatched orders for 20,000 troops to support the emperor.134
Meanwhile, Russia relinquished its remaining Persian possessions. The timing of the
ratification strongly suggests that in lieu of a much sought-after defensive alliance Russia
used the commercial treaty as leverage to secure a resolution coordinated by Britain and
the States General, agreeing to ratify the commercial treaty only after receiving the
resolution. Russia did not need Britain’s military commitment if its negotiations
eliminated the need to maintain a strong presence in Poland so that it could follow
through on its commitment to Emperor Charles VI.
It is difficult to assess how much Britain benefitted from the treaty. The British
received most favored nation status and English merchants gained a one-third reduction
on select tariffs, including on woolen cloth. This provided a considerable advantage over
the Prussians, who had dominated this market in military uniform material since 1724
when they landed formerly British army contracts. Reading indicates that sales of British
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cloth in Russia increased by about one-third in the decades that followed.135 However,
we do not know exactly when the increase occurred. English merchants also received
permission to import and export goods to and from Persia through Russia, and to pay
tariff duties in Muscovite coinage rather than reichsdollars, representing a reduction of
about three percent. The Persian privilege never became significant to the British and
was soon revoked.136 Many of the other treaty provisions dealt with freeing English
merchants from arbitrary action like forced conscription or billeting Russian soldiers, as
well as corrupt business practices. Though Reading indicates that in the twenty-five
years after the treaty the average annual amount of British exports to Russia doubled
those of the preceding thirty-five years, it is difficult to attribute the increase directly to
the treaty.137 By 1740, five years after the treaty’s conclusion, British exports to Russia
were below 1720 levels. Between 1740 and 1750 they had more than doubled.138 Before
attributing these phenomena directly to the 1734 treaty, other factors need eliminating,
and the effects of the treaty’s renewal in 1742 need to be evaluated.
Subsequent to the multilateral exchange among Russia, Britain and Austria in
early 1735, Russo-British diplomacy alternated between disaster and stagnation during
Anna Ivanovna’s reign. The British resident at Constantinople so damaged Russian
interests that, after much urging by Biron and Osterman, King George II finally recalled
him.139 The tables turned as Britain desperately sought a defensive guarantee in
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December of 1738 due to renewed threat from Sweden, and Russia demurred; not until
Elizabeth’s reign, in 1742, would Britain secure its defensive alliance.140 George II
persistently offered good offices to resolve tensions between Russia and Turkey either to
be brushed off by the Russians or completely excluded by Turkey in favor of the
French.141 Osterman expressed frustration at Britain’s unwillingness to threaten the
Ottomans with military action, or to rebuff them more strongly, but overall seemed to
have few genuine expectations of British assistance with the Porte. The coordinated
action of 1734/35 was the highlight and then Britain’s primary usefulness to Russia lay in
its ability to negotiate with the emperor.
Russia did not overcome the backwardness of the Old Rus to enter into the AngloRussian Commercial Treaty of 1734. While Germanophone advisors primarily oversaw
treaty negotiations, the friendliness many Old Rus expressed toward the British suggests
that, had Anna not ascended, another Russian cabinet could have secured a commercial
agreement. Nor did the British carry off a diplomatic coup by forcing Russia to move
forward without a reciprocal defensive alliance. Rather, after the resolution of decades of
factional struggle that strained relations, a formal commercial alliance became possible.
Additionally, Britain’s reconciliation with Austria made its diplomatic efforts useful in
the first half of Anna’s reign. Britain assisted with negotiations to end the War of the
Polish Succession, freeing up Russia to fulfill its troop commitment to Austria and
securing Russia’s chosen candidate for the Polish throne. In exchange, Russia ratified the
commercial treaty. Meanwhile, Britain continued to consume the majority of Russia’s
exports as had been the case for decades and finally, at the end of 1738, tenaciously
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sought a defensive alliance that Anna Ivanovna’s cabinet never entered into. The
formalization of Anglo-British diplomatic and commercial relations in the 1730s was an
effect of Britain’s détente with Austria and Russia’s ability to use the Anglo-Russian
Commercial Treaty of 1734 as leverage to secure the mediation that allowed it to remove
troops from Poland, freeing up troops to support Emperor Charles VI in his Rhineland
territories.
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The Russian army would first occupy the territory between the Dniepr and the Don;
then, in 1737, the Crimea, the Kuban valley, and the Kabardas; in 1738, the low land
of Bessarabia, Moldavia, and Wallachia; and in 1739, it would raise the Russian flag
over Constantinople, where Anna would be crowned Orthodox empress, the
counterpart of the Holy Roman Emperor in Frankfurt.142
This passage describes one of the most common contemporary conceptions of Russia’s
motivation for taking on the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-1739: in search of both religious
glory and control of the Crimea and Black Sea, Empress Anna Ivanovna and her advisors
would reclaim the former epicenter of Orthodox Christendom. Along the way, the
Russian army would subdue the Crimean Tatars and put an end to borderland incursions.
These attributions, however, omit additional, important explanations for the war. While
rhetoric may have emphasized the religious element, British diplomatic correspondence
from the Russian court in the years preceding hostilities reveals the importance to Russia
of maintaining Persia as a buffer to prevent Turkey from taking over territories along the
Caspian that Russia had recently ceded and/or where it maintained significant trade
interests. One major reason for decimating the Crimean Tatars, then, was to prevent
them from assisting the Ottomans against the Persians in the Caucasus region. While a
number of authors mention Russia’s war with Persia in the 1720s, subsequent occupation,
and strategic and trade interests there, they do not integrate these issues into discussions
of the Russo-Turkish War. Russia’s capitulation to the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739,
almost universally considered a humiliating defeat, appears less devastating if considered
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in light of its maintenance of Persia as a buffer and continued to profit from Caspian
trade.
After discussing the source base and reviewing the historiography, we shall move
on to a summary of Russo-Turkish diplomacy from 1729, just before Anna Ivanovna’s
reign began, to the conclusion of the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, shortly before the end of
her reign. Since the threat of war loomed almost constantly throughout this period,
looking at the broader context of Russo-Turkish relations enables us to understand the
causes and context of the 1736-39 war from a wider and deeper perspective than
considering diplomacy immediately leading up to or during hostilities. The chronology is
a consolidation of information related to Turkey from over 1700 pages of British
diplomatic correspondence between the Russian and British courts from 1729-1739.
Finally, a discussion of religion based on the correspondence allows us to look at its
relative importance in opposition to territorial/strategic considerations.
There are a number of reasons to integrate the British correspondence into the
overall discussion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39, despite the problematic nature
of relying on an external party’s accounts. Historians have made little use of British
dispatches emanating from the Russian court in often-cited discussions of the war.
Further, Britain became involved in diplomacy between St. Petersburg and the Porte
through its resident in Constantinople during the lead-up to the conflict. Though British
intervention often harmed rather than hurt Russian interests, or British help was not
desired, the reports still provide insight into motivations, often through first-hand
accounts of discussions with top members of Anna’s cabinet or other diplomats at court.
This extraction of observations of, and participation in, Russo-Ottoman relations does not
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provide a complete picture, but adds to our understanding of the causes and conclusion of
the war. Claudius Rondeau, a British envoy at the court from 1728-1739, wrote most of
the dispatches.143
Many attribute Russia’s desire to gain access to the Black Sea, control the
Crimea, and put an end to Tatar attacks as the chief causes of the Russo-Turkish war.144
Brian Davies claims, “when war between Russia and the Turks and Crimean Tatars broke
out in 1735, it was because Russia sought it, having discerned a window of opportunity in
which to wage it and win the recovery of Azov.”145 According to Karl Roider, Russia
began seeking pretexts to attack Turkey in the years before the war: in 1733 and 1735
when Tatar khans marched through Dagestan.146 While these explanations portray Russia
as awaiting the opportunity for war, Evgenii V. Anisimov suggests that the conflict
emerged from nowhere, stating, “in the autumn of 1735, Russia, quite unexpectedly,
recommenced the war against Turkey,” on hold since the Pruth campaign ended in
1711.147 None of these explanations acknowledge that the two countries had remained on
the brink of war nearly continuously throughout Anna Ivanovna’s reign. As we shall see
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below, avoiding war with Turkey preoccupied much of the court’s energies in the years
before the outbreak of hostilities.
Other, often conflicting, explanations focus on the goals of individual
statespersons. A. Lentin attributes the outbreak of hostilities to “French agitation at
Constantinople,” but focuses on the motivations of individuals in Russia’s cabinet. The
war supposedly represented a reversal of Osterman’s containment policy; he counseled
Anna to avoid war but Biron and Munnich overruled him. Further, Lentin contends that
“all three were confident of a lightning victory with Austrian help, which would avenge
the Pruth disaster of 1711, sweep the Turks out of Europe, and revive the tarnished
prestige of Anna and the German clique.”148 Karl Roider, on the other hand, attributes
the desire to attain the Black Sea’s northern coast to Osterman.149 Lavender Cassels
reinforces this notion and also attributes careerism as a motivation for Munnich, portrays
Biron as seeking to enhance Anna’s renown and to benefit himself, and Anna as desiring
to debase the Turks.150 The religiously focused explanation for the war that opened this
chapter, involving the glorification of Anna as restorer of Christianity to Constantinople,
seems to derive from Munnich’s “Oriental Project.” Gregory Bruess points out, however,
that Munnich did not formulate the plan until 1737, the second year of the war, based on
initial military victories and Austria’s involvement.151 As we shall see below, individual
statespersons’ aspirations and visions alone do not provide a comprehensive explanation
for Russia’s pursuit of the war.
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Additionally, while many authors who discuss the Russo-Turkish War also
describe events in Persia, including the pivotal threat of the Tatar Khan’s marching
through Dagestan, those events are not integrated into a diplomatic-strategic context.
Brian Davies does describe Russian opposition to the march of the Crimean Tatars
through the Caucasus to assist Sultan Mahmud against the Persians and Nadir Khan,
indicating that “sending armies to the Caucasus required that they cross Kabarda and
Daghestan, and moving Tatar troops through Kabarda risked provoking war with
Russia.”152 He explains that, though under the Treaty of Resht in 1732 Anna had
“abandoned the occupied provinces along the southern Caspian, destroyed the Russian
forts south of the Greben’, and pulled Russian forces back to the Terek River…” she still
sought to protect Christians in the mountains of Kabarda and was not willing to give up
that area to the Ottomans or Khanate.153 Davies also indicates that the Russians withdrew
from Derbent in exchange for the ability to trade freely with Bukhara and India.154 As a
long-term effect of the Russian presence in these territories, however, he claims,
“although Peter’s Persian War brought Russia no lasting territorial gains in the
Transcaspian it did serve as a precedent for later Russian imperial interest in the region,
and it provided the Russian army with valuable experience in mountain warfare and joint
operations with the fleet.”155 Though he mentions both trade and the need to
counterbalance the Ottomans, those do not emerge as significant factors necessitating the
Russo-Ottoman war. 156
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Though Alfred Rieber does not discuss these aims in conjunction with Anna
Ivanovna’s strategy, we may view hers as a continuation of Peter I’s efforts to prevent the
Turks from reoccupying the southern Caucasus, “cut[ting] off the Russian penetration of
Iran, and jeopardiz[ing] Russia’s commercial and strategic position all along the
Caucasian and Pontic frontiers.”157 Rieber indicates that though Russia lost western
Azerbaijan and the Georgian kingdoms to the Ottomans with the 1724 Treaty of
Constantinople, it maintained control of the south and west coasts of the Caspian.158
According to Galina M. Yemelianova, the Giandzi agreement of 1735 forced Russia to
cede control of the Caspian to Iran. Though the Russians gave up Derbent, she indicates
that they “managed to strengthen their positions in northern Dagestan by founding the
Russian town of Kyzliar.”159 Further, Rieber indicates that Ghilan remained an important
center of trade for Russia through the 1780s, suggesting that occupying it became less
important than maintaining commerce.160 Rieber describes Zubov’s 1795 Caucasus
campaign under Catherine II in the context of intervening on behalf of Georgia against
Aga Muhammed Khan’s claims. Catherine sought to assist the Georgian king without
alarming the Porte and her general “followed Peter the Great’s campaign trail along the
Caspian coast as a way of demonstrating Russia’s interest in protecting its commercial
interests and keeping the south Caucasus free from domination by either the Qajars or the
Ottomans.”161 If we can attribute strategic and commerce-related motivations to Peter I
and Catherine II, we can certainly recognize that Anna Ivanovna likely sought to
maintain a similar buffer without the human and financial cost of occupying the Persian
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territories. Though Crimean supply lines were difficult to maintain and the war took an
enormous human toll, fighting in, and maintaining a presence in, the Persian territories
would have proven much more expensive over the long run.
Jos J.L. Gommans’ emphasis on the importance of the Iranian silk trade to Russia
over the eighteenth century bolsters the notion that Persia served as an important strategic
buffer against the Ottoman Empire for economic reasons. During Peter’s reign, the
Armenians of Julfa in suburban Isfahan received generous trading rights in Russia,
maintaining a virtual monopoly on silk imports. Gommans estimates that by the middle
of the century, “as much as one third of the total Iranian silk production was directed
towards Moscow and the market towns of Central Europe.” He describes Russo-Iranian
trade as increasing over the eighteenth century “partly as a result of the enormous growth
of the Russo-Siberian silver output, and indicates, “after the eclipse of Safavid Iran the
Julfa Armenians were increasingly replaced by their compatriots from northern Iran,
Russia, and Central Europe.”162 This contention runs counter to work indicating that the
emphasis on trade shifted toward the east, away from Astrakhan. Scott Levi suggests that
attention turned to overland trade with Khiva and Bukhara through Orenburg due to
Nadir Shah’s oppression of Amenian and Indian merchants, disrupting their activities
Astrakhan.163 Arcadius Kahan, however, seems to associate the growth of Orenburg,
Troisk and Semipalatinsk with Russia’s concerns over Chinese tensions.164
Yemelianova’s, Reiber’s and Gommans’ work strongly suggests that even if Russia
promoted and developed Orenburg trade, Persia and the Caspian trade maintained
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strategic value for Russia and it continued to derive benefit from Persia’s remaining a
buffer zone.
Just as many historians point to the need to control the Black Sea as a primary
cause of the war, that the Russians could keep Azov only as an unfortified town, and had
to move their cargo in Turkish ships, emerge as the most-cited humiliating aspect as the
Treaty of Belgrade that concluded the war in 1739.165 Some gains are also
acknowledged. According to Brian Davies, in lieu of territory, the Russian army again
and again vanquished Tatars and Ottomans with few losses, “exposed the vulnerability of
the Ottoman fortress chains on the Dnestr and Bug as well as Dnepr and Don, the frontline Ottoman defenses in Pontic Europe,” and along with the Kalmyk Horde and Don
Host, “greatly reduced the aggressive capabilities of the Crimean Khanate and the Kuban
Horde.” Davies concludes that, after two centuries, Left Bank Ukraine and southern
Russia had become nearly invulnerable to Crimean Tatar raids.166 Shaw sees advantages
in the sultan’s becoming responsible for Tatar raids, and the Russians’ ability to trade
within the Ottoman Empire and travel to holy places, enabling them to stir up Christians.
Additionally, they maintained a strong military reputation in Europe, revealing that
successors had capably continued to develop Peter I’s modernization. Finally, the efforts
informed advances against the Ottomans later in the century.167 Though Davies mentions
the reduction of the Crimean Khanate and Kuban Horde, who could go to Turkey’s aid in
the Caucasus, no one mentions preventing Turkey from encroaching on the Caspian.
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While the chronology below contradicts many historiographic conceptions, one of
the most flagrant is the notion that Russia and Austria began the war simultaneously and
with a concerted plan. Peter F. Sugar notes, “Before Russia moved she came to an
agreement with [the Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI] in Vienna, proof once more of
how in the eighteenth century no great power felt secure to act on her own. After the
conclusion of the alliance the Russians started hostilities in 1736….”168 Shaw presents a
variation in this by indicating, “the way for war was paved by a territorial agreement
between Russia and Austria, with the former to get the Crimea and Azov and the latter
Bosnia and Herzegovina…Russia then sent an ultimatum to the sultan denouncing him
for a long series of violations of the Treaty of Pruth…169 Aleksandr Kamenskii repeats
this refrain: “In 1735, the two allies entered into war against the Ottoman Empire, during
which Russian Troops under the command of Munnich seized and ravaged the Crimea
and won a number of striking victories along the Sea of Azov and Moldavia….”170 The
diplomatic correspondence makes clear that Austria did not enter the war with Russia in
1735. The emperor could not enter into hostilities in 1736 because his troops were held
up with the evacuation of the Spanish and French from territories he claimed during the
War of the Polish Succession.171 Although the Austrians and Russians drafted an
operational plan for 1737, well into the year the emperor continued to attempt to act as a
mediator, even at the Congress of Niemerof.172 As we shall see below, according to
Rondeau’s recollection, it was Vienna’s lackluster performance in Hungary that provided
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the Porte with the confidence to abandon the congress in July of 1737 and gamble on its
ability to defeat Russia and Austria.173
The first phase of Russo-Turkish relations lasted from 1729 – 1732 and focused
primarily on the balance among Persia, Turkey and Russia, especially in relation to
Russia’s Persian territories.174 Rondeau repeatedly emphasized that Russia would not
under any circumstances allow the Ottomans to control the Caspian for economic and
strategic reasons: to allow the Russians to fend off the Tatars, Persians and Turks. The
possibility of conflict between Turkey and Persia presented the specter of Russia’s having
to take a side in that conflict or fight against both sides if they united to attack Russian
conquests. Rondeau specifically reported worry that the Persians and Porte would unite
to drive the Russians out of Ghilan so that the Ottomans could reclaim the silk trade.
There was also conflict between Russia and Turkey over who could claim the allegiance
of Tatar princes in territories that had been divided between the Porte and Persia –
especially the Dagestan Tatars.
During this period Russia continually feared, and intermittently prepared for, war
with Turkey. At times the Russians worried about a joint attack from the Porte and
Sweden, spurred by the British and French (before the British allied with Vienna in 1731)
or the French alone. Diplomats either genuinely worried or liked to scaremonger,
indicating that war with Turkey would make Russia unable to meet its treaty obligation to
supply troops to Austria per the powers’ 1726 treaty. Meanwhile, through court
conversation, Rondeau discerned Turkish concern over Russian actions that violated the
Treaty of Pruth: marching troops into Poland and building forts on Turkish frontiers. In
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1731 Russia began constructing a fortification line from the Don to the Orel to fend off
the Budzi and Crimean Tatars, who served the Turks.
1733 marked a new phase in the categorization of Ottoman relations, which were
now seen in the context of the Polish Succession crisis.175 As Rondeau reported on the
Ottoman-Persian war, he considered it a relief to Turkey’s “European Neighbors,” who
were glad to see the Porte distracted. Rondeau reported the concern that Stanislaus
Lezhenski’s election would result in an alliance among Poland, Sweden, Turkey and
France. In October, news that the Porte had no plans to attack prompted Russian
willingness to supply the emperor with the 45,000 troops promised in the Austro-Russian
treaty (though they would not agree to deploy them until the following March). In late
December the Russian court received a letter from the Porte “expostulating” about Polish
affairs, but news of continual Persian military success quelled their fears.
1734-35 was marked by the ongoing threat of war and disastrous British
intervention into Russo-Ottoman diplomacy.176 The need to ensure that Turkey did not
overtake Persia (and thus the Caspian) remained the Russian impetus to war. The
Russian court felt sufficiently confident in Persia’s strength in early 1735 to give up
control of its remaining Persian territories. However, Turkey soon attacked Persia,
placing Russia on a war footing once again.
As 1734 began, Russia was reportedly in preparations to attack Turkey. By midMarch the prospect of an offensive war faded despite encouragement by the Persian
ambassador. In July Britain and the States General undertook a mediating role in
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Constantinople between the Porte and Russia in order to prevent open hostilities. The
Russian court seemed reasonably content with this arrangement until late November,
when it became clear that the actions of British resident, Lord Kinnoul, did more to
foment conflict at the Porte than prevent a rupture. At the end of that month Osterman
requested that George II recall Lord Kinnoul.177
In 1735 tensions that had been simmering since at least 1729 brought the Ottoman
Empire and Russia close to war.178 First, news in late January that the Ottomans did not
plan to attack Russia, and thus it was no longer necessary to keep so many troops on
Turkish borders, relieved the court. In May Rondeau reported that Anna felt sufficiently
reassured that the Persians had enough strength to prevent the Ottomans from taking over
any of the remaining territory in Russian control, and therefore had agree to relinquish
them. In late June developments in Persia led to the most urgent talk yet of war between
Turkey and Russia. News from Constantinople revealed that the Turks would attack the
Persians in the areas the Russian court believed secure, requesting that a Crimean Tatar
khan send an army through Persian territory to join the Turks. Though the Russians had
received assurances from the Porte that the Tatar khan and his men would not cause harm
to Russian subjects as they passed near their dominions, Osterman said directly to
Rondeau that Anna would never allow the Turks to settle on the Caspian, and declared
the same to the ambassadors from Poland and Vienna. Rondeau opined that Anna would
never have relinquished the remaining Persian territories to the Persians had she believed
the Ottomans would attack. The Russians dispatched soldiers to remain on watch in case
177
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the Tatar khan began his march toward Dagestan. The issue that the Turks raised in
1729, regarding the Russians inappropriately courting the allegiance of the Dagestan
Tatars, came up again as Osterman declared “ancient privileges” over them and
complained that the Turks would attempt to control them if they were allowed to take
over Dagestan. Late in the year Russian troops evacuated Persia, leading Rondeau to
believe that the Tatar khan would not pass through Dagestan that year. He assumed, due
to the number of troops they were amassing in the Ukraine, that the Russians would
attack Turkey in the spring. In August, the disruptive Lord Kinnoul was finally recalled
by London.
Throughout the first months of 1736, the Russians attempted to discover the
Tatar’s khan’s movements.179 By late February the Tatar Khan had turned back toward
the Crimea, Tachmas Kuli Khan had taken command of the Dagestan Tatars in Derbent,
and Turkey engaged in massive war preparations. The Russians indicated that they
planned to attack in late March; after hostilities began there was still an opportunity to
avoid full-blown war with Turkey. However, all sides played a waiting game. With
Turkey and Persia still engaged Russia did not want to settle with the Turks for fear that
Persia would also; Osterman was convinced that the Porte would attack immediately
upon making peace with Persia. Emperor Charles VI of Austria faced difficulty freeing
up troops as the French and Spaniards slowly evacuated the Italian territories he had
acquired in the just-completed War of the Polish Succession. Vienna did not enter the
war with Russia in 1736 and offended the court by attempting to mediate on behalf of
Russia and the Turks rather than behave as Russia’s ally. The Russians would have
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preferred that the emperor admit he could not honor his commitment to supply troops
rather than stall and act as an arbitrator; those who rationalized the defensive alliance
with the emperor as necessary to securing a reliable ally against Turkey now had little
basis for defending Vienna. Britain’s tepid diplomatic efforts also irked the Russian
court. Before it would enter into peace negotiations, Russia insisted on receiving
proposals from the Porte to redress all of the harm perpetrated along its borders. Russia
did not think Britain insisted on these terms forcefully enough. Additionally, the court
resented the efforts of the States General, Austria and Britain to generate proposals out of
Vienna rather than through St. Petersburg. Not until late August would Anna order
Osterman to draft conditions for peace. Subsequent to Munnich’s retreat from the
Crimea in October, and internal tumult in Persia, Turkey sought to bring France and
Sweden into negotiations to counterbalance the preponderance of nations it viewed as
Russia’s allies. After months of communication regarding Turkish and Russian
requirements for a meeting on the frontiers, in December Britain approved a backchannel plan suggested by Rondeau that would allow the Porte to save face by not
submitting to Russia’s desire to propose peace conditions directly. Meanwhile, the
Persians had reportedly negotiated peace with the Turkey. While Anna directed the
Russian envoy at Vienna to collaborate on a plan for spring military operations, Biron
complained that the emperor would not threaten to attack the Ottomans if they did not
make peace with Russia that winter. Russia ended the year dissatisfied with its allies.
Much of 1737 revolved around conditions for meeting on the frontiers and the
eventual Congress of Niemeroff, which met July through October.180 The congress failed
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when Vienna’s belated and unsuccessful military operations bolstered Turkish
confidence. Much of the correspondence for the rest of the year focused on efforts to
reconvene a congress.
The 1738 correspondence revolved primarily around the struggle for control of
mediation with the Porte.181 Vienna’s desire to place mediation with the Porte in the
hands of France alone, without the input of the maritime powers, would leave Russia
without intermediaries by the year’s end. While the emperor insisted on France’s
participation in mediation, Russia agreed to it only on the condition that the Dutch and
British would also mediate. Vienna applied considerable pressure to no avail and
eventually consented to the maritime powers’ inclusion. In May it became clear that the
Porte would not consent to assembling a second peace congress as it ignored the letters
from the Dutch and British residents on the subject. A victory at the Perecop in July did
not diminish Russia’s strong desire for peace. The Russian court hoped that additional
Russian and imperial victories might make the Porte ready to negotiate. In September
Rondeau reported that a French courier from Constantinople communicated directly to
Munnich that Turkey would settle if Anna returned Kinburn and Oczakof and razed
Azov’s fortifications. Additionally, the emperor would need to satisfy the Protestant
Transylvanian rebel Rakotzy. Meanwhile, in October irritation over the emperor’s paltry
troop deployment in Hungary led Rondeau to surmise that the Russo-Austrian alliance
might rupture. While the emperor had encouraged the Porte to take advantage of Dutch
and British efforts in Constantinople, the French envoy eventually excluded the British
and Dutch residents entirely from negotiations with Vienna’s knowledge. In November,
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in order to preserve their dignity, both Britain and Holland removed negotiating powers
from their envoys at Constantinople.
In 1739 most of the diplomatic correspondence focused on renewing negotiations
with the Porte through the British and Dutch residents in Constantinople.182 The Grand
Vizier’s deposition in March provided a new opportunity for reconciliation and Russia
secretly allowed the French sole control of the mediation.
After Munnich’s successes in early September led the Russians to believe they
could drive Turkey to retreat, on September 11 Rondeau reported that Anna had raised
forty thousand recruits. Then, on September 15 he indicated that an estafette had
revealed that the emperor made a separate peace with the Porte. Vienna sent news on the
29th that Russia’s peace had been signed on the 18th. On October 13, after Rondeau’s
untimely death, his secretary Bell reported that Anna had given full negotiating powers to
the French envoy at Constantinople, Villeneuve. By the end of October the Treaty of
Belgrade had been ratified.
As we have seen, in the years leading up to the war, the threat of a rupture with
the Ottomans remained almost constant and the British diplomats at the Russian court
repeatedly reported on the Russians’ need to prevent the Ottoman Empire from gaining
control of the Caspian. Due to amicable relations with the Persians, the ability to trade in
Persia duty free without the expense and difficulty of maintaining a garrison, and
confidence that the Persians could fend off Turkey, in 1735 Russia ceded the few
territories remaining of those Peter the Great’s soldiers had claimed in the 1720s. The
Porte then rapidly attacked Persia, alarming the Russian court. Russia sought to prevent a
Crimean Tatar Khan from crossing through Dagestan to Turkey’s aid; the ability to claim
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the allegiance of the Dagestan Tatars emerged as a contentious issue in 1729 and 1736.
According to the British correspondence, this march was the initial cause of hostilities in
1735, and in 1736 the indication that Turkey planned to attack Russia if the Persians
surrendered put Russia on the offensive.
A survey of religious language as it related to the Russo-Turkish war reveals that
it emerged from the British Northern Department rather than St. Petersburg. In February
of 1735 Lord Harrington made two references to the “Christian powers.” First, he simply
indicated that the resident in Constantinople assured the British court that “the Turks”
would “not break out at least this year with any of the christian powers. . .”183 The
following week, Harrington wrote regarding a Swedish envoy who had opposed the
Russians in Poland and whose assignment to the Porte the Russians wanted to block.
When describing the justification he would send to the resident in Stockholm to block the
envoy, Harrington wrote that the resident should emphasize that his appointment would
upset Anna, “since he was so active and zealous a person in the affairs of Poland while he
continued in that kingdom, and may from the same principles fall in with those who are
ready to animate the turks against the christian powers on that side, which His Majesty
takes all the pains he can to prevent.184 Thus, Britain and Sweden were not united to
defend the Protestant interest. Rather, Britain sought to assist Russia in preventing the
Swedish envoy from joining parties who sought to agitate the Porte against its Christian
neighbors, Russia and Austria.
Rondeau would occasionally send descriptions of populations unfamiliar to the
British court whose protection was a matter of dispute between Turkey and Russia. In
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April of 1736 he wrote about the Saporog Cossacks since they might be unfamiliar to the
“Christian world”: “They profess the greek religion, and when they were under the
protection of the turks, the patriarch of Constantinople furnished them with priests; but
since these two years that they are under the protection of the Czarinna, their priests are
sent them by the archbishop of Kioff. They have only one church, which is served by an
abbot and a few priests...”185 In August of 1735 he wrote about Crimean khans: “twenty
two sovereignties or khans are mahometans, and the Crim tartar khan pretends they are
under his protection, which this court denies, and is a continual occasion of disputes
between the russ and the turks.”186 Rondeau provided these descriptions for whatever
usefulness of knowledge they would provide to the king, however, he does not frame
them as causes of the current war.187
In addition to explaining the situations of specific populations, Rondeau reported
on religious/national communities encountered through the course of hostilities. In June
of 1736 when relaying news of Munnich’s taking the town of Kozolov, he indicated that
the town was “a place of great trade, having a good harbour,” where there were, “a great
many greeks and armeniens, and some jesuits; the latter are retired to Constantinople.”188
In July of 1737 Field Marshal Lacy reported that a prince he had taken prisoner indicated
that the Crimean khan had held an assembly at the Perecop in order to debate whether to
submit to Anna, “since they found the Ottoman Porte was not at present in a condition to
protect them against the russ. We shall soon hear, my lord, if the tartars take that
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resolution; but as all those people are mahometans, few can yet persuade themselves, that
they will submit to the russ till the last extremity.”189 While Rondeau does not portray
the Christians as in any way grateful for the Russians’ suzerainty, Crimean Tatar
Muslims are portrayed as unwilling to submit to an Orthodox sovereign. Again,
conversion and liberation are not revealed as motivations.
Finally, Rondeau reported on religious court ceremony associated with victories
over Turkey and the Tatars. In June of 1736 when Russians took over Perecop, “the
cannon of the citadel and admiralty were fired by the Czarinna's order two hours after the
arrival of the courier, and Her Majesty went to the church in the citadel to return god
thanks for the great advantages her arms have gained over the tartars.”190 When Azov
surrendered in July of the same year, “the cannon of the cittadel and admiralty were fired,
and Her Majesty went to the great church, where a Te Deum was sung.”191 In August of
1737, “Her Czarish Majesty went to church with a great train to return thanks to God for
the good success of her arms over the inﬁdels. All the great guns of the citadel and
admiralty were ﬁred.”192 Although Rondeau chose the word “infidel,” we can assume
that Russian court’s victories over Muslims held special significance. Though Rondeau
reported Anna’s visits to church in relation to a variety of other celebrations, no specific
battle during the War of the Polish Succession merited a special church visit (or a report
on one). Thus, the religious dimension of the conflict was to some degree integrated into
court culture.
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Though the court identified against its Muslim adversary, overall Rondeau’s
dispatches counterbalance other sources that amplify Munnich’s “Oriental Project.” We
saw above that Bruess indicated that Munnich generated the vision based on experiences
on the ground. Rondeau’s reports support this notion of the generals’ encountering local
Christian populations and the overall conflict between Turkey and Russia over the
allegiance and protection of Orthodox communities. Comparing these religious issues
with the need to control the Caucasus and Caspian for strategic purposes, however,
diminishes their importance as a causative explanation.
If Russia could have claimed the Crimea, controlled the Black Sea, and reclaimed
Constantinople, it would have gained glory and riches. Protecting against Tatar
incursions was clearly necessary, as the Crimean and Budzi Tatars had caused enough
concern to prompt the construction of a fortification line in 1731. Ensuring that the
Ottomans could not disrupt the buffer zone maintained by the Persians and commandeer
Caspian trade, however, were also compelling reasons to do battle against Ottoman allies
on the Pontic Steppe and in the Crimea. The Russians were still able to benefit from
trade originating in Persia and abandonment of the Persian possessions relieved the
military servitors who complained of the difficult climate, unreliable supply lines, and
massive human toll. Additionally, the expense of maintaining the Persian presence was
prohibitive. Thus, the Russians knew how difficult it would have been to assist the
Persians in their dominions relative to the battlefields the Russians chose. Further,
whereas the issue of the Persian buffer zone remained constant, Rondeau did not mention
Russia’s desire to overtake the Crimea until 1735. While religion clearly informed the
court’s perception of its victories, and may have contributed to personal motivations, the
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correspondence does not reveal them as long-standing motivations for war. Clearly, we
should consider the British diplomatic correspondence, and what it reveals about the
Russo-Persian-Ottoman balance, when considering Russia’s motivations for going to war
against Turkey in 1736.
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Conclusion	
  
We have seen that generally in Europe, and specifically in Russia, confessional
strife remained divisive into the 1730s. Additionally, both the cultural “Westernization”
that occurred under Peter, and the “Germanization” under Anna Ivanovna exhibited
Lutheran features. Peter’s top theologian and propagandist, Feofan Prokopovitch, whose
Lutheran leanings attracted so much criticism, was restored to prominence in Anna’s
reign after persecution under Peter II. Further, Anna’s court culture reinforced
acceptance of Lutheranism while actively ridiculing Catholicism. The integration of
elites from Baltic regions annexed during the Great Northern War, who kept their own
church and legal/cultural institutions, largely explains the acceptance of Lutheranism.
The elite cultural “westernization” that occurred during this time can be considered
confessionalized westernization. Finally, in discussing “Germans” in Russia, scholars
should make an effort to distinguish among foreign servitors and elites from integrated
lands, as referring to them generally as “German” elides important differences.
While religious conflict held the potential to incite Catholics, Protestants and the
Orthodox throughout Europe, statespersons did not make decisions about war and peace
based on religious factors. Though religion was used to inflame passions, especially
through the publication of pamphlets, and seems to have been extraordinarily important
to people of all confessions, it did not unite heads of state. Protecting Orthodox and
Protestant dissidents in Poland did not motivate Russia’s or Britain’s actions in the War
of the Polish Succession. Further, while Anna may have held special church services to
celebrate victories over the “infidel” “Turks,” the diplomatic correspondence does not
reflect any efforts to unite Christian powers in a crusade. Similar to the language about
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the “Protestant Interest,” references to “Christian Powers” come across as obligatory
turns of phrase. Further, that Munnich developed his “Oriental Project” after securing
victories and encountering Christians who sought Russia’s protection, supports the notion
that territorial, strategic and economic concerns outweighed any fantasy about reclaiming
Constantinople.
In the case of Russia’s war against Turkey from 1736-39, the need to keep a
Persian buffer zone on the Caspian to maintain trade was an important motivation for
exterminating Crimean Tatars. Eliminating populations sympathetic to the Ottoman
Empire who could come to its aid in the Caucasus seems very likely to have increased the
security of the Persian buffer zone, in addition to reducing incursions into Russian
territory. Though the Russians may have preferred more advantageous Black Sea and
Crimean gains, we can consider the maintenance of Caspian interests an important goal.
Finally, we saw that the “backward” “Old Rus” nobility did not prevent Russia
from entering into a formal commercial agreement with Britain before 1734. British and
Russian factional divisions and geostrategic considerations made it impossible for formal
relations to resume until Jacobite hopes for a British invasion were quelled, the
Schleswig/Holstein issue was resolved, and Britain reconciled with Russia’s primary ally,
Austria. That Russia did not gain its much sought-after defensive alliance as part of the
commercial treaty was not a diplomatic failure, a manifestation of one “German”
statesman’s strategy winning out over another’s, or Russia’s dependence on Britain.
Rather, in exchange for the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734,
Britain and the States General negotiated the evacuation of the pretender to the throne
during the War of the Polish Succession, allowing Russia to remove its troops from
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Poland and deploy them to assist the emperor. Britain’s alliance with Austria made it
useful to the Russians during that period, whereas later in the reign it was Britain who
desperately sought a defensive alliance with Russia and was repeatedly rebuffed.
While remaining narrow in its temporal focus, this work has challenged
historiographic perspectives that obfuscate key aspects of Anna Ivanovna’s reign. Future
work will integrate examinations of seventeenth-century cultural and confessional
westernization and elite integration, continuity and change in the religious rhetoric
justifying anti-Turkish alliances among European powers, trade and imperial expansion,
and discussion of the ways in which reimagining Anna’s reign shifts our perceptions of
eighteenth-century Russian foreign policy and diplomatic relations.
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